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The United States is and will continue to be engaged in a form of warfare 
in which the enemy finds shelter among and gains intelligence from the 
population.  This is not a new form of warfare, but, given the advances in 
technology and increased globalization of the modern age, it has become an 
exponentially more lethal form of conflict.  This thesis examines current U.S. 
unconventional warfare doctrine to determine its origins and assess its feasibility 
in different environments.    Drawing upon the military theories of Clausewitz, this 
paper attempts to lay out a new approach and broaden the spectrum of American 
unconventional doctrine and irregular response.  An examination of the American 
“hearts and minds” approach to unconventional warfare, based largely upon 
British colonial experience, suggests that current doctrine could be based on a 
faulty interpretation of history.  Newly emerging knowledge points to the need to 
adopt an unconventional strategy focused more on establishing authority than 
gaining popularity.  This approach, dubbed “authoritative control,” has both a 
historically successful track record and is fairly easy to implement.  For the 
United States to be successful in future unconventional conflict, an expansion of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND OF THESIS 
In July of 2004, I was assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School to 
pursue a Master’s degree in the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict 
curriculum from the Department of Defense Analysis.  I was asked by the 
leadership of my career field to begin thinking about possible roles and future 
missions of a new organization that is being created within the Air Force.  This 
new organization, dubbed the Battlefield Airmen (BA), would need to combine 
four different Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs), each of which has unique 
missions and skill sets.  It also would need to effectively support both 
conventional and special operations units in missions that cover the entire 
spectrum of conflict. 
Initially I began to focus on taking these four AFSCs and researching how 
to best organize to fill mission sets that were required in several past conflicts.  
My approach dramatically changed after a half year of study at NPS when I 
began to realize that the skills needed in past conflicts may not be the ones 
needed to confront the enemy that we will face in the future.  In the past, the 
combat control, pararescue, combat weather, and tactical air control parties 
existed as force enhancers, each with a special niche to fill in helping find, fix, 
and destroy enemy military forces.  This piece argues that, while these skills may 
remain relevant in the future, the military as a whole needs to realize that new 
skills and strategies must be developed and implemented to fight a shadowy 
enemy who achieves victory by avoiding the conventional conflicts in which the 
United States excels.  Because of this approach, the main focus of my thesis 
changed from simply merging four existing career fields to an entirely different 
topic of reevaluating how future conflicts will be waged and the necessary 
strategy and reorganizations needed to best implement this new style of war.  
The initial intent of proposing a redesign of Air Force career fields is only briefly 
addressed in the conclusion, while the majority of attention goes to a style of war 
likely to dominate the future of warfare: unconventional warfare. 
2 
B. APPROACH TO RESEARCH   
To develop a compelling argument for the need to make major 
adjustments within the Department of Defense, I felt it necessary to draw upon 
long-established theories and views of warfare.  Naturally, I turned to the writings 
of Carl Von Clausewitz as the foundation of my argument.  While reading 
Clausewitz, I began to feel that, while his approach to developing grand strategy 
remained valid, several of the assumptions he made about the nature of warfare 
have changed to such a degree that it is necessary to adopt a new approach to 
developing operational strategies.  While he stated that war consists of three 
main actors (military, government, and population), the majority of his writing 
deals exclusively with how to target just one: the opposing military force.  I felt 
that in today’s environment another Clausewitzian actor, that of the population, 
has gained such a degree of power and significance that we are forced to 
research methods in which to confront an enemy that knows how to harness its 
power.   
Where Clausewitz serves as the theoretical base for my argument, I chose 
to use the writings of Dr. Edward Luttwak, who has served as a consultant to the 
Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Department of 
State, as my model on how to approach this new style of warfare.  While his 
writings also deal mainly with methods on how to best approach the targeting of 
an enemy military force, I felt they also could be applied to approaches needed to 
target the base of an enemy’s support among the population.  Where the types of 
weapon systems and intelligence techniques change when targeting the 
population, the characteristics applied to the two approaches to war remain 
unchanged.  By taking the foundations of his two approaches, I felt it possible to 
incorporate his ideas into the unconventional fight. 
Of course, when dealing with terms like conventional and unconventional 
warfare, interpretations vary wildely and often cause great confusion when 
debated.  In an attempt to lessen the ambiguity of the terms, if felt it most 
appropriate to classify each conflict based on its primary targeting priorities.  
Discussed at length within the thesis, an unconventional conflict is one in which 
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both side place primacy on targeting the population in an attempt to garner 
support (both physically and politically).  Relying upon the courses taught in the 
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, an argument is made that this type of conflict is the one likely to 
dominate future battlefields.      
After establishing my interpretation of future war, I felt compelled to 
provide the reader with the strategic changes required by this new focus and the 
tactical implications that follow.  The writings of men like Mao Tse-Tung, Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara, and Vo Nguyen Giap proved essential in explaining the strategy 
of waging a war in which the primary focus shifts from the military toward the 
population.  Case studies that include the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, 
the Malayan counterinsurgency, the Mao-Mao revolt, the Philippine 
counterinsurgency, and the Chinese Revolution provided excellent details on the 
driving forces behind unconventional conflicts and the tactics necessary to 
combat them.  The relevance of these examples are called upon several times 
throughout my writing to highlight several variables the United States tends to 
overlook or discard because of our historical interpretations.  
While I thought it was important to overview the changing nature of war 
and the methods to best confront that change, I also felt it important to expose 
the current weaknesses within the American unconventional doctrine by 
exposing the widely accepted “hearts and minds” approach as a misinterpretation 
of historical evidence.  I present the reader with an alternative explanation, one 
that has had both a historical record of success and is fairly easy to implement 
given the current hierarchy of military forces, with the hope of expanding the 
boundaries of unconventional warfare doctrine.  Drawing again on Luttwak, an 
argument is made for a strategy capable of adapting quickly to externalities and 
forces capable of operating between the widened right and left boundaries of 
doctrine.       
In the final chapter, I hope to provide the reader a concise conclusion and 
several courses of action that should be considered when developing future roles 
4 
of unconventional forces.  Using the argument I developed in previous chapters, I 
recommend pursuing skills, education, and training that de-emphasize targeting 
an opposition’s military, and empower strategies and develop skills that harness 
the power of the opposition’s people.  While I risk putting the cart before the 
horse promoting the implementation of these recommendations, I hope to 
convincingly argue that moving in this direction now, despite the fact of current 
engagements throughout the Middle East, will prevent dysfunctional inertia in the 
future. 
 The appendix of this thesis is a very simplistic game theory analysis that 
could be used to determine the amount of resources dedicated to unconventional 
warfare based on future threats.  The analysis was inspired by a project 
conducted in Models of Conflict, a Master’s level class on game theory analysis.1  
While the approach to estimating the costs of future war are open to debate, the 
conclusions reached by the analysis could have a lasting impact on future 
resource allocation.      
Admittedly, few of the ideas in this thesis are original.  I owe a tremendous 
amount to the genius and high-caliber instruction of each professor within the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense Analysis program.2  Much of my argument 
is a continuation of themes and ideas cultivated in several classroom discussions 
and lectures, and despite my best efforts, proper credit will probably not be given 
to this fine cadre of professionals.  Saying that, several points of my thesis 
actually disagree with some ideas exposed at NPS, and they therefore should 
not be interpreted as an indication of lessons taught there. The primary goal of 
this thesis was not to create new, untested concepts that could be debated ad 
nauseum, but instead to draw on well-established doctrine and update these 
teachings with new approaches and organizations.  Understandably, some 
                                            
1 Frank Giordano.  Classroom Instruction:  Models of Conflict.  Monterey, CA; Naval 
Postgraduate School (Spring 2005). 
2 Of particular importance to the origin and development of my ideas were the teachings and 
concepts of Dr. Gordon McCormick in the Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare course and Dr. Anna 
Simons in The Military Advisor course and in personal discussions.  Both courses are core 
classes within the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
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approaches recommended require further research and experimentation, but 
they have such a strong record of success that they can no longer be ignored. 
The overall aim is to provide the reader with a document that identifies a current 
military weakness and proposes a method by which to rectify the problem.  While 
I understand that several recommendations could be asking too much in terms of 
military reorganization and alteration of political thought, it is my wish that my 
work provides at least a starting point for future discussion on how to best 
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II. VIEWING WARFARE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT 
A. CLAUSEWITZ REVISITED 
Most pieces written on military doctrine inevitably draw on the teachings 
and theory of renowned military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz.  This discussion 
is no different, but attempts to blend Clausewitz’s timeless lessons with modern-
day approaches to warfare in order to reveal and possibly correct flaws inherent 
to the American war-making structure.  While several great minds have made a 
strong case that Clausewitzian thought no longer applies because of the rise of 
non-state actors and the fundamental changes in the concept of the Westphalian 
nation-state3, I feel that his approach to creating grand strategy is still applicable 
and requires reevaluation in light of current threats. 
One of the most important contributions Clausewitz made to the 
development of proper military strategy is the recognition of three main aspects, 
or actors, that must be considered when developing military theory.4  As 
Clausewitz states “the first of these aspects concerns the people; the second the 
commander and his army; the third the government.”5  Clausewitz contends that 
when developing theory to defeat future opponents, one must realize that these 
three aspects are interrelated and that each opponent has a center of gravity that 
can be exploited based on the opponent’s type of government and the 
                                            
3 This line of thought predominates in Martin Van Crevald’s Transformation of War (1991).  In 
it, Van Crevald argues that Clausewitzian thought has become almost irrelevant due to the fact 
that Clausewitz wrote under the assumption that a Westphalian nation state would retain a 
monopoly on violence in the future.  As we see today, because technology and communications 
have empowered small groups (through increased efficiency in terrorism) and globalization has 
been able to bring them together, the state no longer has a monopoly. Therefore, according to 
Van Crevald, Clausewitz’s basic assumptions are no longer applicable.  While I agree that the 
world we live in today is dramatically different than the one in which Clausewitz lived, the nature 
of war and the need to balance passion, chance, and reason while targeting an opponents 
population, army, or government remains a valid foundation on which to develop military theory.       
4 The three actors in warfare should not be confused with the three variables Clausewitz 
describes in his “paradoxical trinity.”  This trinity consists of passion (blind natural force), chance, 
and reason (making war subordinate to policy, and therefore, constrained by political factors).  
While Clausewitz’s writings are open to wide ranging interpretation, it has become a common 
error to associate the “paradoxical trinity” with the three actors that participate in warfare.      
5 Clausewitz, Carl Von.  On War.  Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.  
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89. 
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relationship of that government to its population and armed forces.  He goes on 
to state that, “the task, therefore, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance 
between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three 
magnets.”6  A military strategist must be able to assess the nature of future 
warfare and begin to structure his forces to best target his opposition’s center of 
gravity, be it the army, the population, the government, or some distinct blending 
of the three.  It is impossible for the strategist to tailor his force to perfectly target 
every possible opponent’s center of gravity, so he must be willing to accept a 
force that is capable of targeting what he see as the predominant aspect of the 
majority of his possible future foes.  The nation most capable of properly 
foreseeing these future aspects and preparing its force to confront them will hold 
a huge advantage in the majority of its military conflicts.  Those military powers 
unable to foresee and adapt its forces to the predominant aspects of warfare will 
either be immediately destroyed or be slowly drained of power until it becomes 
irrelevant in the international arena. 
While Clausewitz acknowledges three aspects in creating military theory, 
he devotes most of his time to discussing how to target an opponent’s military 
force structure.  It is fully understandable why Clausewitz focuses on the army 
aspect of warfare, as it tended to fully dominate the style of wars fought up to and 
during the early nineteenth century.  Clausewitz, although likely uncomfortable 
with the nuances and possible powers of a people’s war, does slightly 
acknowledge a type of conflict that is dominated by the aspect of the population.  
In Book 6, Chapter 26 of On War, Clausewitz tips his hat to the notion of a 
people’s war, and writes that, “any nation that uses it [people’s war] intelligently 
will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use.”7   He closes 
his assessment of a people’s war by hinting that he, personally, does not feel this 
type of warfare would ever gain primacy, but leaves the door open by stating that 
it would be possible if criteria were met that allowed an army to “gain by the 
                                            
6 Clausewitz, Carl Von.  On War.  Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.  
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89. 
7 Ibid. p. 479 
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further expansion of this element of war.”8  I argue (and support this argument in 
the following chapter) that, due to the empowerment of individuals and small 
groups through globalization, the criteria are now in place for conflicts to be 
dominated by the aspect of war Clausewitz pays relatively little attention to: that 
of the population. 
 
B. CLAUSEWITZ’S MODERN INTERPRETATION 
Modern military thought also acknowledges differing types of war and 
uses the term conventional warfare to describe conflicts that focus primarily on 
the military aspect of war, while the term unconventional warfare is used to 
describe conflicts that revolve around targeting the opposing population.  When 
talking of conflicts dealing with the primary targeting of an opposition’s 
government, the term revolutionary warfare is often used.  The problem with the 
use of these terms is that, in light of current threats, the terms are often twisted to 
mean different things in different situations, and they begin to lose their original 
meanings when debated.     
In this discussion, the term conventional warfare is used to refer to a style 
of warfare that revolves around the premise that an opposition’s center of gravity 
lays very close to its military power, and once this military power is defeated, the 
government and its people will acquiesce to the demands of the victor.  
Conversely, the use of the term unconventional warfare is used to describe 
conflicts in which the opponent’s center of gravity rests closely with the 
population, and, by targeting and gaining the support of that population, one is 
able to gain the clarity of intelligence necessary to target the leadership and 
military forces of the enemy.  The primary differences between unconventional 
and conventional war, therefore, are in targeting priorities.  When discussing 
conventional war, it is appropriate to assume a targeting list that gives utmost 
importance to destroying the military infrastructure, communication systems, and 
troop formations of the enemy.  The importance given to Clausewitz’s three 
                                            
8 Clausewitz, Carl Von.  On War.  Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.  
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 479. 
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actors naturally become: (1) military targets, (2) government, and (3) population.  
In conventional warfare, intelligence, weaponry, and tactics are designed to best 
degrade the military capacity of the opponent.  While the primary targeting 
priority of conventional war is the opposition’s military, it is quite possible to also 
include the opponent’s population and government in target lists, but only with 
the understanding that the primary goal is to degrade the power of the enemy’s 
military.9  It also is possible to conduct conventional warfare using 
unconventional forces as long as the primary objective of those forces is to 
support a strategy in which the overarching objective is the destruction of the 
enemy’s armed forces.10 
When discussing unconventional war, a polar opposite targeting priority 
arises.  The unconventional strategy stresses the following priorities in targeting 
an opposition: (1) population, (2) government, and (3) military.  This definition, 
based on targeting priorities, is a departure from the “official” definition provided 
by the Department of Defense.  According to Join Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint 
Special Operations, unconventional warfare is: 
A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally 
of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or 
surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, 
and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes 
guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility, covert, or 
clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of 
subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and 
escape (E&E). 
Due to the vague nature of the DoD definition and the constraints it inevitably 
places on strategists, defining warfare based on targeting priorities helps 
                                            
9 Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki can be viewed as targeting the opponent’s population in 
pursuit of a conventional strategy.  The Allies believed that the best way to win the war was to 
force the military to surrender, and the best way to do so was to demonstrate the ability to use 
powerful weapons that were capable of destroying the entire nation. 
10 For example, using the population (militia or guerrilla forces) to destroy transportation lines 
that support an adversary’s military, or conducting hit and run ambushes to whittle away the 
morale and resources of the enemy military.  The initial U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, in which 
Special Forces soldiers supported the Northern Alliance to destroy the Taliban forces serves as 
an example of this.  
11 
delineate conventional strategy from unconventional.11 Although this definition 
may not encompass all of the specific nuances, overlap, or underlap of terms 
such as irregular warfare, partisan warfare, insurgency, or counterinsurgency, I 
feel it better allows a reader to distinguish between styles of warfare.  Just as a 
conventional strategy can include the people on target lists, so too can an 
unconventional strategy attempt to target an opponent’s armed forces.  The 
difference between an unconventional strategy and a conventional one is what 
end state these attacks have.  Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns, a 
hot topic in today’s discussions on warfare, are just two subsets of 
unconventional warfare.  As stated before, in a conventional strategy, targeting is 
geared to destroying the military actor of an opposing nation in an attempt to 
render that nation powerless.  An unconventional strategy targets an opposition’s 
military forces only when assured of success; it does not expect to destroy the 
enemy’s military, but to convince the population of its enemy’s impotence.  The 
point of every major attack is to gain support of the population and degrade the 
status of its opposition in the eyes of its people.  One must also remain cognizant 
of the fact that it is possible to wage an unconventional campaign with 
conventional troops as long as the use of these troops is to gain control of the 
population, not to destroy the enemy’s military.12 
In conclusion, when discussing conventional or unconventional strategy, 
this paper focuses on the overall objective of the strategy and not the tactics or 
personnel used to prosecute it.  A war strategy always should focus on how to 
best target an opponent’s center of gravity; it gains its title on which of the three 
actors it deems most important.  For a conventional strategy, the military is most 
significant; for an unconventional, the population is paramount; and for a 
revolutionary, the government is the main target.   
                                            
11 The following thesis, published in June of 2004, supports this line of thought:          
Stephen P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, “Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional 
Warfare” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).   
12 For example, using conventional troops to conduct village security, internal policing, or 
rebuilding infrastructure in an attempt to win the support of a given population.  General Douglas 
MacArthur’s occupation of Japan serves as another example of using conventional troops in an 
unconventional strategy. 
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C. LUTTWAK’S TWO APPROACHES TO WAR 
Once a nation has determined the aspect of war (people, army, or 
government) that is likely to dominate future conflicts, it must then determine 
what approach to take to wage that particular type of war.  I now turn to the 
writings of a more modern thinker, Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, to propose a method 
for determining the proper approach. 
One of the most thought-provoking articles written on approaches to 
warfare is a short piece published in a 1987 book titled Dimensions of Military 
Strategy.  The article, Notes on Low Intensity Conflict, describes two approaches 
a nation may take in developing its military forces in order to face future threats 
and adversaries.  The first method, what he dubs attritional warfare, has enough 
literature written on it to fill several American libraries.  The second, relational-
maneuver warfare, has comparatively little written on the subject despite the fact 
that it is the style of warfare most likely to dominate the future battlefield. 
Attritional warfare, as describe by Luttwak, is characterized by a nation’s 
attempt to efficiently win conflicts by bringing “superior material resources, by 
their transformation into firepower, and by application of the latter upon the 
enemy.”13  He describes how, as a military becomes more oriented to this style 
of warfare, it tends to be focused more on internal efficiency, administration, and 
daily operations.  While this approach is excellent in mass production of weapons 
systems, formalization of military education, and maximizing the utility of 
command lines, it tends to give less importance to the external environment and 
the specific nuances of the particular enemy.  The external environment 
encompasses several variables: the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, 
the terrain (both cultural and physical) upon which the war will be fought, and the 
specific phenomena of any one particular conflict.  An attritional army cannot be 
expected to adapt quickly to these variables, as it could possibly violate some of 
the internal processes that have been established in past confrontations.  Other 
environmental factors are only considered insofar as they “present obstacles to 
                                            
13 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low Intensity Conflict” in Dimensions of Military Strategy, 
ed. George Edward Thibault (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1987), p. 336. 
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the transportation, deployment, and efficient application of firepower on an 
enemy force.”14  Armed forces molded in the attritional style are known for being 
more interested in their own inner workings in order to “maximize process 
efficiencies all around.”  Relating this back to Clausewitz’s theories, it would 
seem possible for a military force to adopt an attritional style of warfare directed 
at an opposition’s military actor (e.g. Napoleonic warfare) or adopt an attritional 
approach to war focused on the opposition’s population (e.g. British Mau Mau 
Counterinsurgency).    
The second style of warfare discussed in Luttwak’s piece is the relational-
maneuver approach to conflict.  This is not to be confused with the term 
“maneuver warfare” (which actually describes an attritional tactic); the relational-
maneuver approach to warfare instead describes a military that tends to be 
outer-regarding and capable of adapting to environmental externalities.  Armed 
forces of this nature seek to obtain victory by identifying the, “specific 
weaknesses of their particular opponent, and then reconfiguring their own 
capabilities to exploit these weaknesses.”15  Consequently, relational-maneuver 
armies usually cannot maximize internal efficiency and do not develop optimal 
organizational formats, methods, or tactics.  “Instead, each must be relational, 
i.e. reconfigured ad hoc for the theater, the enemy and the situation.”16  The key 
to victory for a relational-maneuver army does not lie in the realm of 
overwhelming effective firepower, but instead, upon the ability to “interpret the 
external environment” and alter their own organizational format, operational 
methods, and battlefield tactics to best fit the specific problem they are in conflict 
with17.  Instead of applying a well-proven model to a particular enemy, a 
relational maneuver unit looks to create a new model to fit the particular nuances 
of that enemy.  Again tying back into Clausewitzian thought, a nation could adopt 
a relational maneuver force focused on defeating an opponent’s military (e.g. 
                                            
14 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low Intensity Conflict” in Dimensions of Military Strategy, 





Desert Storm) or develop a relational maneuver force focused on an opponent’s 
population (e.g. British Malayan counterinsurgency).   
Luttwak argues that neither style of warfare holds any inherent value over 
the other, only that most nations have historically developed, according to their 
relative position of power, to best achieve the strategic goals of their country.  It 
is appropriate, then, for countries rich in resources to pursue an attritional style of 
warfare, where poorer countries adopt a relational-maneuver style that offers 
high payoffs with minimal material cost.  Luttwak also states that is nearly 
impossible for any nation to achieve a pure style of attritional or relative 
maneuver warfare, and that their approach should be viewed as lying 
somewhere along a continuum between the two.   Therefore, if we combine both 
Clausewitz’s actors in war with Luttwak’s approaches to conflict, we can describe 
a nation’s style of warfare in four different ways:  militarily focused, attritional 
approach; militarily focused, relational maneuver approach; population focused, 
attritional approach; population focused, relational maneuver approach.18 
   
D. KNOW THYSELF: KILL, CAPTURE, DESTROY… 
The Post-Cold War U.S. military is a glowing example of what a balanced 
approach to defeating an opponent’s military can accomplish.  The same military 
also serves as an example of how a singularly focused force can be exploited in 
an unconventional fight.  By formalizing internal acquisition processes, 
establishing formal, standardized education channels for all personnel, and 
strictly managing promotion procedures, the current U.S. military has proven to 
be an almost invincible force on the modern battlefield.  These same processes 
and procedures have unfortunately opened gaping holes in American power.  
Characterized by stealth bombers, huge battleships, armored tanks, large 
formations of technologically advanced soldiers, and remotely piloted weapons, 
the US military has accomplished some of the most complete and stunning 
                                            
18 One could also argue for government focused, attritional approach; or government 
focused, relational maneuver approach, but for the sake of brevity and clarity, I will limit the 
discussion to the two predominant actors in modern war.   
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defeats of its adversaries.  While the development of this force was perfectly 
rational in a historical sense, the defense structures implemented in the past may 
prove extremely costly against future opponents. 
 Like all great military powers, the United States has developed its doctrine 
by carefully scrutinizing historical theories, interpreting them, and then 
modernizing these concepts to coincide with the increased lethality of modern 
weapon systems.  Early in American history, a set of prescriptions were 
generated by top decision makers to specify how U.S. military forces would be 
structured and employed in order to respond to recognized threats to national 
security.19  These prescriptions, steeped deeply in Clausewitzian strategy, have 
been highly successful in numerous conflicts and have provided great support in 
America’s climb towards superpower status.  Unfortunately, the American 
interpretation of Clausewitzian strategy also may serve as the impetus for a fall 
from this status. 
In his famous piece On War, Clausewitz goes into great detail on how a 
commander should structure an army, the methods he should take in employing 
them, and tactics one should use when confronted with several different 
situations.  In fact, over 90 percent of his writing dealt with maximizing efficiency 
within a military unit in order to achieve synergy of military effort on a given 
military target.  Unfortunately, most American military advisors reflect far too long 
on the tactical military application of Clausewitz and lose sight of his most 
profound contribution to military thought; that of maintaining a balanced force 
capable of targeting all three war actors.  Because the majority of On War is 
focused on targeting an opponent’s military, the majority of take away lessons 
deal with conventional warfare.  In the past, the notion of the Westphalian nation 
state20 permitted conflicts between countries in which the nation with higher 
attritional capability usually emerged victorious.  Today, however, with increasing 
                                            
19 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.  (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press,  
1984), 181. 
20 The concept of a Westphalian nation state is one in which the government possesses a 
monopoly on violence, has sovereignty in a given territory, and is recognized in the international 
arena. 
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globalization, the rise of non-state actors, and a boom in technological advances, 
the superiority of a military focused, attritional-leaning army has taken a severe, 
possibly even fatal, reduction of power when facing an unconventional opponent.   
It is easy to demonstrate that the American military, operating under the 
assumptions of perpetual Westphalian nation-state supremacy, chose to hone its 
skills on defeating Clausewitz’s second variable, the opposing military, and 
create the most formidable battlefield force the world has ever known.  After the 
end of World War I and World War II, American policy makers bore witness to the 
terrible consequences a military defeat could have upon a country.  In the eve of 
World War I, the Ottoman Empire was carved up by the victors and essentially 
ceased to exist.  Germany, suffering much the same fate as the Ottomans, 
became impossibly indebted and was forced to dismantle its entire military 
apparatus.  World War II held nearly the same consequences for those defeated, 
and required implementation of efficient procedures to transform national 
resources into military firepower.  In the aftermath of these brutal conflicts, 
American decision makers deemed it necessary to create a military force that 
could achieve victory on any conventional battlefield and project power anywhere 
on the globe.  What evolved over the next half-century was the formation of the 
most powerful militarily focused force the world has known.  An argument 
promoted by Donald Vandergriff in The Path to Victory is that the decisions made 
during this development were made during and immediately following desperate 
situations that are fundamentally different from the situations we currently face.  
This now leaves us prepared to face an enemy who we are unlikely to confront 
directly and ill-prepared to battle the new enemy that has grown out of 
globalization and technological advances.21  While the U.S. created the most 
capable force to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess an opposing military 
enemy (Clausewitz’s second variable), it neglected the ability to properly engage 
and control Clausewitz’s first and, given current trends, most important variable: 
the opposing population.  Because of the interpretation of history, the United 
                                            
21 Donald Vandergriff, The Path to Victory.  (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, Inc., 2002): 11. 
17 
States began to focus exclusively on just one of the Clausewitzian actors, 
inadvertently forming a weakness in military might that has and will be exploited 
in the future. 
 
E. KNOW THY ENEMY:  THE RESPONSE TO U.S. MILITARY 
SUPERIORITY    
 Like the country forced to adopt a relational-maneuver approach to 
warfare because of resource limitations, the United States has effectively placed 
the rest of the world in the position of relative deprivation in terms of military 
might.  No other country in the world, save China, could possibly imagine 
devoting as many resources to a military force as does the United States.  By 
gaining an overwhelming advantage in conventional warfare, the U.S. has left the 
world with only two options: (1) become allies with the U.S. or other international 
alliances and be subjected to possible long-term control and manipulation22, or 
(2) develop a military strategy capable of defeating an exceptional militarily-
focused army in order to openly oppose the U.S in the international arena.   
According to Luttwak, the natural choice becomes a relational-maneuver force 
that targets the gaps in American power instead on confronting the invincible 
military it possesses. 
Where Clausewitz serves as the foremost strategic authority on 
conventional based warfare, Mao-Tse Tung appears to best capture the spirit of 
the unconventional approach in his writing On Guerilla Warfare.  In this, he 
outlines the primary steps to properly conduct an unconventional campaign.  
These seven steps are as follows: (1) arouse and organize the people; (2) 
achieve internal political unification; (3) establish bases; (4) equip forces; (5) 
recover national strength; (6) destroy the enemy’s national strength; and (7) 
regain lost territory.23  Vietnam should have served as an eye-opener to the 
                                            
22 Although a country could be subjected to manipulation from a superpower or alliance, it 
does stand the chance to benefit from the arrangement.  Not all aspects of this option are bad, 
but the country does lose a bit of long-term power in these arrangements.   
23 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare.  Translated by Samuel B. Griffith II. (Chicago, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2000), 43.  
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United States military that this form of war is extremely powerful.  It was a conflict 
in which the enemy’s center of gravity rested with the population  and proved 
capable of defeating even the most technologically superior military. I believe 
General Vo Nguyen Giap put it most succinctly when he wrote, “they [the 
Americans] believe that the adversary’s backbone is its armed forces, and that if 
they can defeat those, they can end the war, but if they cannot do so, the war will 
last a long time, and they will be defeated.”24  Giap, the legendary Vietnamese 
general, understood that the United States was incapable of deviating from a 
strategy that favored the targeting of military forces.  He also understood that he 
could push the conflict into the realm of the unconventional, and by using a 
relational-maneuver approach in targeting Vietnam’s population, he could 
sidestep the American military and exhaust the psychological and political will of 
the United States.  Instead of learning that this form of war exposed a 
fundamental weakness in American power and that steps should be taken to 
address this power gap, the United States chose to avoid these types of wars.  
Unfortunately for the US, its enemies learned that this was exactly the style of 
warfare that they needed to bring to the American doorstep.    
 While no nation can afford to confront the American military directly, 
several states (and a few non-state actors as well) are now engaged in an 
indirect targeting campaign intended to pull the U.S. into a protracted war that 
requires a deep understanding of unconventional warfare and the ability to 
rapidly adapt to specific threats and environments.  Future enemies will continue 
to exploit the weaknesses of the militarily focused strategy the U.S. employs, 
and, much like the Germans circumvented the Maginot Line in WWII, simply 
side-step the overwhelming conventional power of the American military. 
 
F. TRENDS OF FUTURE WAR 
The modern paradigm for warfare, in which nation-states wage war 
for reasons of state, using formal militaries…[is] being eclipsed by a 
post-modern approach..National sovereignties are being  
                                             
24 Vo Nguyen Giap, Big Victory, Great Task. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), 24. 
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undermined by organizations [terrorists and other non-state armed 
groups] that refuse to recognize the state’s monopoly over armed 
violence.25 
 The use of the term fourth-generation warfare (4GW) has become a 
hot issue in many military circles.  In some camps, 4GW is not accepted as a true 
“generation” as the strategy that drives it has been around since the beginning of 
warfare itself.  In other camps, 4GW is a form of warfare that has arisen and 
been empowered through modern technology and worldwide communication.  I 
tend to agree with both camps, and I would argue that, while it is true that the 
strategy of 4GW is nothing new, the environment that it now operates in is 
fundamentally different than anything the world has known. Because of that, 
perhaps it is necessary to discuss 4GW as a new “generation” in warfare and 
something the US military should begin to adopt. 
While the use of the term 4GW is subject to debate, the trends that it 
promotes are clearly being used throughout the world against the United States 
today.  Some of these trends include: 
• operations are highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in 
approach 
• operations are employed to bypass the superior military power of 
nation-states to attack and exploit vulnerable political, economic, 
population, and symbolic targets, thus demoralizing the government 
and its populace 
• enemies wear no uniforms and infiltrate into the populations of their 
targets.  Old distinctions between civilian and military targets 
become generally irrelevant.26 
Despite the subtle nuances espoused by different advocates of 4GW, the 
underlying trend in each is that the importance of the population has grown 
dramatically when compared to previous conflicts.27 
                                            
25 Martin Van Crevald, The Transformation of War.  (New York: Free Press, 1991), 224. 
26 Schultz, R.H. and R.M. Beitler. (June 2004).  Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in 
Al’Qai’da’s Operations.  Middle East Review of International Affairs.  Volume 8, No. 2. 
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Several examples exist in which unconventional strategies were used to 
mobilize the support of a population and defeat a militarily superior adversary.  
Mao Tse Tung used this strategy to defeat the Japanese during the 1930’s and 
1940’s.  Che Guevara also supported this strategy when he (along with Fidel 
Castro) first overthrew the Batista regime in Cuba and then set out 
(unsuccessfully) to spark a people’s revolution throughout Latin America.  Most 
well know to the American population was the North Vietnamese use of the 
population to erode military and national will during the Vietnam War.  While each 
of these examples were successful, they occurred in a time in which the ability to 
communicate with the entire population at once and personally command the 
entire conflict was inconceivable.  Today, as Al Qaeda is demonstrating, it is 
possible for an enemy to communicate with the population with relative ease, 
while simultaneously remaining concealed among the populace.28  This new 
product of the information age, instantaneous global communication, elevates the 
unconventional strategy to the same level, if not higher, than that of conventional 
strategy.   
Whether or not one wants to actually use the term 4GW, the fact that 
globalization and technological advances have empowered small groups enough 
to achieve global reach must be recognized and dealt with.  Drawing back to 
Clausewitzian thought, it is important that the United States begin to take the 
measures necessary to understand strategies and operational methods for 
targeting an enemy’s population.  These methods and strategies must go well 
beyond the often muttered, but hardly understood, mantra of “hearts and minds” 
to develop a force that is as capable of operating in the realm of the 
unconventional as well as it is in the conventional.  To do so, a base of  
 
                                            
27 Some excellent reading on 4GW can be found at the website for Defense and the National 
Interest located at http://www.d-n-i.net/second_level/fourth_generation_warfare.htm  Accessed 20 
September 2005.  There are several articles and presentations that argue for the acceptance of 
the term 4GW, as well as quite a few after action reports and governmental speeches that 
support the use of the terminology.  In each of these readings, the importance of targeting the 
population is noted and deemed of great importance. 
28 The numerous videotapes and messages broadcast over the Al Jazeera network are just 
one example of mass communication while remaining concealed. 
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understanding must be gained about unconventional warfare, and past 
operational methods must be updated to achieve success in a highly-connected 
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III. NEW FOCUS, NEW APPROACH 
A. SHIFT FIRE 
If one accepts that the focus of future war is shifting away from one of 
Clausewitz’s actors (the military) and closer to another (the population), then it is 
critical that a discussion on the grand strategy and approaches necessary to be 
successful within this realm begin.  The United States would then need to move 
its resources and personnel away from the militarily-focused style of warfare at 
which it excels, and implement strategies capable of capturing the support of a 
population.29  It also means that the United States must reevaluate its approach 
toward unconventional warfare to determine its historical track record and future 
feasibility.  To do so, the foundations of unconventional doctrine must first be 
examined.  Finally, the future threat that unconventional warfare holds must be 
assessed.  This chapter argues that while unconventional warfare has been 
viewed as nothing more than a sideshow in the past, the environment and 
technology exist today to place unconventional conflicts squarely at center 
stage.30 
It would be unfair to claim that the United States military does not deal at 
all in the unconventional realm.  In fact, several careers in the American military 
stress the importance of harnessing the power of the population.31  
Unfortunately, these career tracks are currently undermanned, under funded, and 
viewed as irrelevant when compared to their conventional front line counterparts.  
The most disconcerting aspect of these careers is that they typically have been 
educated by a conventional-minded system that teaches an approach that is both 
                                            
29 Undoubtedly, the United States cannot afford to move too many resources towards 
unconventional warfare as it could lose its stature as a superpower in conventional warfare.  To 
determine this distinct blend, leaders must conduct a detailed game theory analysis to determine 
the amounts allocated to both conventional and unconventional warfare.  A simplistic example of 
how to do so is included in the appendix of this thesis. 
30 During World War I, the Arab unconventional campaign directed by T.E. Lawrence was 
routinely described as nothing more than a “sideshow to a sideshow.” 
31 These career fields include, but are in not limited to, Psychological Operations, Civil 
Affairs, Foreign Internal Defense units, FAO programs, and Army Special Forces. 
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faulty and, in most cases, impossible to implement.  This flows directly from the 
education of the vast majority of American military officers. 
Whenever American military leaders are asked how to win an 
unconventional conflict, the immediate answer is overwhelmingly to “win the 
hearts and minds of the people.”  In fact, a recent testimony given to the United 
States House of Representatives highlights the population as the predominant 
center of gravity in the current war on terror, and goes on to outline the ‘hearts 
and minds approach’ as the key to attaining victory.32 This approach asserts that 
victory can be won by addressing the grievances of the population in an effort to 
win their affection and support.  Because the United States has become so 
attached to this one strategy, it has lost its ability to look externally and adapt to 
environments that require different strategies.  Once the United States realizes 
that gaining the support of the population is a battle for outright authority instead 
of a popularity contest, serious strides can be made towards making an 
unconventional force capable of behaving in the proper relational-maneuver 
approach, instead of operating within the constraints of an ineffective model.   
 
B. A FAULTY INTERPRETATION: THE “HEARTS AND MINDS” 
APPROACH  
“That nauseating term I think I invented”- Sir Gerald Templar, when 
referring to the term “hearts and minds” 15 years after the Malayan 
Emergency 33 
When comparing the successful unconventional campaigns of the United 
States to several other countries, it becomes painfully obvious that America does 
not perform well in these conflicts.  In its partial defense, the United States has 
had relatively little experience in the unconventional domain and, for the most 
part, has had bad experiences in those instances.  Adding to the problem is the 
American knack for losing any experience or lessons learned during these 
                                            
32 Andrew Krepinevich, “Are We Winning In Iraq?” Testimony before United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Armed Services.  (17 March 2005). 
33 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-
1960.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1. 
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conflicts.  This lack of experience has forced the US to turn to other nations with 
far more experience to develop their unconventional strategy.34  Therefore, one 
can begin to understand the faults of the American model by understanding how 
the United States has interpreted the lessons learned from past unconventional 
conflicts, usually waged by other countries.  
Much of American unconventional doctrine has come from Great Britian 
and their approach to targeting a population.  For centuries, the Brits, due in 
large part to past imperialistic aspirations, have been forced to quell popular 
uprisings around the world.  The British have witnessed both overwhelming 
successes and devastating defeats in unconventional conflicts that span almost 
every imaginable environment.  The fortunate aspect of these experiences is that 
we have a recorded history and tactical examples on how to conduct an 
unconventional campaign.  The unfortunate aspect is that the British routinely 
‘edited out’ several aspects of their campaign if they proved too inhumane or too 
embarrassing for public disclosure.  Perhaps more unfortunate is the fact that the 
United States based its “hearts and minds” approach to unconventional warfare 
(UW) on this carefully edited literature without a full comprehension of the 
methods used to successfully win these conflicts. 
Scholars and military leaders routinely point to the British 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Kenya as the foundation for the 
current American “hearts and minds” UW model.  Although the term “hearts and 
minds” first appeared in a letter authored by John Adams in February of 1818 to 
describe the foundation of the American Revolutionary War, it became a 
mainstay in military vernacular after extensive literature was produced describing 
the British approach to winning the unconventional conflict in Malaya.35   
Because the victors often write military history, several variables in this British 
                                            
34 The 1960 Special Forces Manual Counter-Insurgency Operations combined several 
strategies developed by colonial powers, mainly British, to form the roots of American 
unconventional warfare doctrine.  
35 The date of John Adams quote was obtained through communication with the E Pluribus 
Union Project, a body of scholars dedicated to understanding communications in the 
Revolutionary War.  The exact phrase in which “hearts and minds” can be found is located at 
http://www.assumption.edu/ahc/1770s/pintro.html.  Last accessed 20 November 2005. 
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model were omitted. Today, evidence has emerged supporting the argument that 
the British cared more about establishing authority by targeting the minds and 
altering the environment of the population than they were about gaining 
popularity through winning hearts.36  This new information alone must force the 
United States into reevaluating its interpretation of British and, in turn, current 
American unconventional strategy. 
Fueled by the success in Malaya, British generals Sir Gerald Templar and 
Sir Robert Thompson became the foremost authorities in conducting 
counterinsurgency campaigns.  These campaigns were designed primarily to 
gain the support of the population which, in turn, garnered the intelligence 
necessary to defeat an unconventional enemy.  Perhaps the clearest explanation 
of British focus was written by Thompson in his 1966 book Defeating Communist 
Insurgency.  In it, he writes: 
An insurgent movement is a war for the people…the battle in the 
populated areas represents a straight fight between the 
government and the insurgents for the control of the rural 
population37 
It is apparent through these writings that the British understood that the focus of 
these conflicts was squarely in the realm of the populous, but somehow most 
written history focused on the widely-accepted ‘hearts’ aspect of gaining popular 
support despite the fact that the sometimes brutal ‘minds’ aspect was of the 
utmost importance. 
 This observation is best supported by the popular historical view of the 
British Malayan and Kenyan experiences, one in which the British gained victory 
by winning the support and hearts of the population.  Newer pieces on the 
subject reveal a much darker side to the British approach and they make one 
wonder how the ‘hearts’ approach was ever interpreted from these harsh 
                                            
36 An excellent history on the development of the term “hearts and minds” can be found in 
the introduction of the following book: 
Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960.  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
37 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency:Experiences from Malaya and 
Vietnam.  (London: Palgrave,1966). 51, 116. 
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campaigns.  Most pieces written on Malaya attribute the British victory to 
resettlement programs, the building of a bottom-up intelligence system, and 
pacification through economic and infrastructure development.  While the 
resettlement of rural peasants to state-controlled “new villages” certainly helped 
separate the insurgents from the popular support base, the notion that this 
method was aimed at the hearts of the people is ludicrous.  The basic strategy of 
this resettlement program was to take a largely Chinese rural population, move 
them from their remote jungle farmlands, and relocate them in “new villages” that 
could be protected and supported by the British.  This resettlement is often 
portrayed in literature as a benevolent act on the part of the government, aiming 
to protect the people from the roaming bands of communist insurgents.  By the 
time the conflict had ended, between 500,000 and 650,000 people had been 
relocated into these well-secured villages.38  While this initially comes across as 
a humane act and one that would win the hearts of any person looking for 
security, details have surfaced that indicates this perception could not be further 
from the truth.  These resettlements are now described as being carried out “with 
little regard to the feelings of the Chinese” resettlers.  The following excerpt from 
John Newsinger’s British Counterinsurgency provides the best description of 
these harsh British methods:   
Settlements were encircled by large numbers of troops before first 
light, then occupied at dawn without warning.  The squatters were 
rounded up and allowed to take with them only what they could 
carry.  Their homes and standing crops were fired, their agricultural 
implementations were smashed and their livestock were either 
killed or turned loose.  Some were subsequently to receive 
compensation, but most never did.  They were then transported by 
lorry to the site of their ‘new village’ which was often little more than 
a prison camp, surrounded by barbed wire fence, illuminated by 
searchlights.  The villages were heavily policed with the inhabitants 
effectively deprived of all civil rights.39 
Another study comments on the resettlement and regrouping programs 
implemented by the British.                                             
38 John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland. 
(Palgrave: New York, 2002), 50-51. 
39 Ibid.p. 50. 
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Keeping in mind the economic distress villagers faced, the 
deterioration in conditions in the NV’s [New Villages] and the 
restrictions which circumscribed everyday life, one is nonetheless 
forced to conclude that they were indeed pacified.  But this is very 
different from saying that their hearts and minds had been won.40  
Within these camps, food was closely supervised and could be either withheld or 
generously distributed based on the support the inhabitants gave the Brits.  Food 
denial programs also were implemented throughout the country and produced 
extraordinary results in gaining intelligence and isolating the insurgents.41  While 
the primarily British-authored literature seems to paint a much kinder picture, one 
begins to realize that gaining popularity was of secondary importance to the 
establishment of an authoritative force. 
 The second aspect in which the Malayan (and Kenyan) model may have 
been misinterpreted is in the increase in human intelligence networks used to 
reveal and target the insurgent forces.  Soon after his appointment as High 
Commissioner and Director of Operation of Malaya, General Templar expressed 
that he gave the highest priority to intelligence when he remarked to a 
newspaper correspondent that Malaya “will be won by our intelligence system.”42  
Most work gives credit to the British ability to develop a network of informers and 
agents among the population to reveal the location and identity of the insurgents.  
Again, this viewpoint seems very agreeable until the methods used to develop 
this network are exposed.  Many of the agents and informers that provided 
information were at one time prisoners of the British, who were turned during 
interrogations.  Unfortunately for the advocates of the ‘hearts’ approach, these 
turnings were accomplished through some very cruel methods. 
To many of these sergeants [police interrogators] every Chinese 
was a bandit or potential bandit, and there was only one treatment 
for them, they were to be ‘bashed about.’ If they would not talk a 
                                            
40 Francis Kok-Wah Loh, (1988). Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters, and New 
Villagers in the Kinta Valley.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 161. 
41 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-
1960.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 167. 
42 Harry Miller, Jungle War in Malaya: The campaign against communism, 1948-1960.  
(London: Arthur Barker, Ltd, 1972), 90. 
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sock on the jaw or a kick in the guts may have the desired result.  I 
myself once saw a British sergeant encouraging a heavy-booted 
policeman to treat a suspect like a football.  The young Chinese 
was kicked all around the room until a threat to report this treatment 
brought the game to a stop.43  
This style of interrogation was also later used in Kenya to suppress the “Mau 
Mau” Revolt.  According to Wunyabari Maloba, “the chief characteristic of the war 
against the Mau Mau was brutality.”44  British interrogation methods in Kenya 
were hardly aimed at winning hearts, as Robert Edgerton describes in his piece 
Mau Mau: An African Crucible. 
If a question was not being answered to an interrogator’s 
satisfaction, the suspect was beaten and kicked.  If that did not lead 
to the desired confession, and it rarely did, more force was applied.  
Electric shock was widely used, and so was fire.  Women were 
chocked and held under water; gun barrels, beer bottles, and even 
knives were thrust into their vaginas.  Men had beer bottles thrust 
up their rectums, were dragged behind Land Rovers, whipped, 
burned, and bayoneted.  Their fingers were chopped off and 
sometimes their testicles were crushed with pliers…Some police 
officers did not bother with more time consuming forms of torture; 
they simply shot any suspect who refused to answer, then told the 
next suspect who had been forced to watch the cold blooded 
execution to dig his own grave.  When the grave was finished, the 
man was asked if he would now be willing to talk.  Sometimes 
suspects were forced to watch while others were killed, often 
slowly, with knives instead of bullets.45   
While it is hard to argue against the fact that the British were able to gain 
intelligence superiority by forcing the people to support them, it must be 
understood that the methods by which they accomplished it in no way resembled 
an effort to win the “hearts” of the population. 
 Next, the need to dedicate tremendous amounts of resources toward 
stabilization efforts and infrastructure rebuilding when waging an unconventional 
fight may prove to be an improper interpretation of history.   While the British did 
                                            
43 Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya.  (London: Praeger, 1954), 89. 
44 Wunyarabi O Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An analysis of peasant revolt.  (Bloomington 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 91. 
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push money and resources into public works projects and rebuilding  
governmental infrastructures, it appears that this was done more to help maintain 
an indefinite presence in the region than it was to improve the welfare of the 
people.   Infrastructure was only built if it would later serve the interests of the 
British Empire, consequently establishing long term control over a nation through 
indirect economic, agricultural, diplomatic, or informational pressures.  While 
defeating the uprising was the primary concern, the British were taking steps to 
gain political footholds, never losing sight of their future interests.  This is seen in 
a directive put forth by the British Prime Minister in which he states, “even after a 
self-Government has been attained, the British in Malaya will have a worthy and 
continuing part to play.”46  Although craftily worded, it seems apparent that the 
British had their own interests in mind by establishing a working government in 
their colonies.  In Malaya, for example, the most important public work projects 
included the establishment of competent police forces (to maintain control), the 
creation of banking organizations (to take advantage of the tin and rubber boom, 
both major exports of Malaya), the creation of better roads (to deliver these 
goods), and contracting organizations (to ensure all public works projects had a 
British fingerprint on them).  Templar saw these public works as a means of 
establishing “a strong Malayan state that was accepted by the population and 
remained loyal to the Empire.”47  Further works, such as building churches, 
sanitary systems, entertainment venues, and improving medical services, were 
later accomplished “to give the Malays a sense that their grievances were 
recognized, even if not as much was being done to redress them as most 
desired.”48 While there is certainly nothing wrong with fulfilling overlapping 
interests, to view these improvements in infrastructure and public works as an act 
of overwhelming kindness on the part of the British is almost laughable given 
newly emerging data and the track record of the British Empire.  
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 Turning to a more recent example, an example that has received far too 
little attention in light of current events, we must consider the strategies used to 
defeat terrorism in Punjab during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.  Like Malaya, 
a myth has propagated that it was political reform (not the use of coercive 
violence) that won the day in India.  In fact, it was a large-scale imposition of 
martial law, strict internal policing, and a very concerted effort between Indian 
police, military, and para-military forces that curbed terrorist activity in Punjab.  
According to a recent Faultlines article written by K.P.S. Gill, each time a political 
solution was sought in Punjab and “through measures referred to as ‘winning the 
hearts and minds of the people’- usually an euphemism for a policy of 
appeasement of terrorist elements- terrorism escalated.”49  It was only through 
the use of very authoritative measures (an approach that will be discussed at 
length in the following section) that terrorist activity was diminished and 
eventually defeated.  Due to the human tendency to believe what one wants to 
believe, the very authoritative measures used in Punjab were somehow bent to 
portray a much kinder picture than what really happened.               
 Looking through the annals of history, this researcher has been unable to 
find even a single case study that was actually won by implementing a true, 
American-style “hearts and minds” approach.  From the ancient Romans to the 
imperialistic French, history shows success is gained by establishing authority, 
not popular affection, when attempting to gain the support of a population.50  
Perhaps the British are viewed as benevolent only because their methods were 
not nearly as harsh as their imperial counterparts.  Regardless of its origin, it 
becomes painfully obvious that the “hearts and minds” approach towards 
unconventional warfare was meant for domestic consumption only, and that the 
                                            
49 K.P.S. Gill, “Endgame in Punjab,”  Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution. Vol. 1 
No 1.  (New Delhi: Institute for Conflict Management, May 1999), 2. 
50 An excellent reading on the Roman methods of conquest include:  Edward Luttwak, The 
Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire:  From the First Century AD to the Third. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1979).  Pieces written on the French methods of population control and 
conquest include:  Douglas Porch, The Conquest of the Sahara.  (New York: From International 
Publishing Corporation, 1986).  Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco.  (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1982).  
32 
campaign implemented in far off countries was much more an exercise in 
establishing authority and maintaining control over critical resources than it was 
in targeting hearts.   
 
C. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: AUTHORITIATIVE CONTROL 
It is not my intent to advocate the use of tactics that blatantly violate 
human rights or cross the line into the realm of immorality, but it is necessary to 
understand that most unconventional victories have been extremely brutal affairs 
and have required extraordinary measures in which to gain the support of a 
population.  Before beginning this discussion, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between basic human rights (those of security, shelter, and 
sustenance) and the rights afforded to people living in an operating, established 
democracy (freedom of speech, freedom to bear arms, freedom to protest, 
freedom of movement).  It is my opinion that the latter freedoms only come after 
security has been established and a de facto government is in place and capable 
of controlling the masses.   
Drawing on a Machiavellian notion of power, it could prove more effective 
to be feared than to be loved when attempting to gain a population’s active 
support, and it, therefore, may be necessary to limit some of the more advanced 
human rights.  Where it is possible to gain support by conducting exercises 
aimed at winning the hearts of a populace and participating in goodwill activities, 
all efforts should be made to do so.  Most times, however, the American military 
will go into an environment in which it is impossible to gain the hearts of the 
population, calling for efforts to establish a local authority and control the 
environment in which they operate.  The first problem with this strategy is that the 
American military (and political structure) is organized, trained, and educated to 
perform only missions aimed at gaining “hearts” and routinely shy away from 
campaigns designed to establish outright authority.  The second obstacle to this 




combined with the ever-watchful eye of the global media, would allow for the 
implementation of several techniques necessary to win an unconventional 
conflict.  
Returning to Dr. Luttwak’s two approaches to warfare, it is appropriate to 
describe American unconventional warfare doctrine as lying extremely close to 
the “attritional” approach as it tends to focus on internal efficiency instead of the 
dynamics of the external environment.  The United States routinely attempts to 
use the cookie cutter “hearts and minds” approach in every unconventional 
environment, and should the results be less than desirable, instead of changing 
strategy, the US simply does more of the same.  When asked to conduct an 
unconventional campaign designed to win the support of the population, the US 
military immediately begins efforts to capture the “hearts” of the population, 
although the environment may dictate that these efforts will have little to no effect 
in gaining that support.  In American doctrine, missions to build schools, roads 
and wells, along with efforts to provide food, books, and candy for children 
immediately surface as necessary tasks without truly understanding whether or 
not they will have their intended effect.  In areas that are already open to the 
thought of American intervention, these efforts may produce solid results.  In 
areas that hold serious reservations about American involvement, these missions 
only produce ‘daytime friends,’ while the population continues to support the 
unconventional enemy and serve as ‘nighttime enemies.’  The American military, 
therefore, must develop doctrine flexible enough to respond to both 
psychologically permissive and non-permissive environments.  A relational-
maneuver approach, capable of adapting to the specific nuances of our enemy, 
must be adopted and doctrine must support operations that range from the 
“hearts and minds” (addressing grievances) to the Machiavellian (establishing 
outright authority). 
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The current situation in Iraq shows that the American approach works 
fairly well in locations that are receptive to American involvement.51  
Unfortunately, this approach does little to gain the support of a population in 
areas that have a fundamental hatred for all things Western.  In environments 
such as these, it may be more important to develop a Machiavellian style 
doctrine instead of one relying on appealing to the “better nature of men.”  In a 
recent article published in Special Warfare, a Civil Affairs sergeant makes a 
strong case for adopting this approach in certain environments.  In the article he 
claims “psychological studies have long held fear of loss and promise of reward 
to be among chief behavioral influences.”52  He goes on to say that tactical 
variations of the stick and carrot approach have produced desired results.  The 
trick now is to take these tactical successes and fit them into a strategy designed 
to take tactical victories and weave them into overall success.  Although difficult, 
this is not impossible, as historical models exist to suggest the power an 
authoritative approach can have.  As shown above, if Malaya is interpreted as 
more recent history suggests, it serves as a successful model of establishing 
outright authority to gain the support of the population.  Again, gaining support is 
far different than gaining popularity among the people.  Often, coercive 
techniques may need to be used in order to control, secure, and care for the 
overall welfare of the populous.  This use of force should never be shied away 
from, as many see it as a responsibility of the government (or occupying force) in 
times of crisis.  Turning again to the successful counter-terror campaign in 
Punjab, this concept is expressed beautifully in a Faultlines piece written in May 
of 1999.  It states: 
The ‘liberal’ mind has always remained ambivalent when 
confronted by the fact that the State, among other things, is a 
coercive instrument, and that it must, from time to time, exercise its 
option of the use of force- albeit of judicious, narrowly defined and 
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very specifically targeted use of force- if it is not to be overwhelmed 
by the greater violence of the enemies of freedom, democracy, and 
lawful governance.  To fail in this legitimate coercive authority is, 
thus, not an act of non-violence or of abnegation; it is not a 
measure of our humanity or civilization.  It is, rather, an intellectual 
failure and an abdication of the responsibility that randomizes 
violence, alienating it from the constitutional constraints of the state, 
and allowing it to pass into the hands of those who exercise it 
without the discrimination and the limitations of law that govern its 
employment by the State.  In doing this, it make innocents the 
victims of criminal violence, instead of making criminals the targets 
of its own legitimate and circumspect punitive force.53  
To fully pursue this approach, a serious paradigm shift must be made in the ways 
America approaches unconventional war.  This shift pushes the United States 
closer to the ideas and theories proposed by Niccolo Machiavelli, a 15th century 
political advisor and diplomat. 
The approach espoused by Machiavellian thought will be referred to as 
the “authoritative control” approach for the remainder of this discussion.  This 
approach tends to be much more direct and, in some cases, harsher than the 
hearts and minds approach.  The primary goal of the “authoritative control” 
approach is to create an environment of security and order in which forces may 
begin to plant the seeds of democracy.  In entering this discussion, it is important 
to remember that the point of this paper is not to espouse one approach over the 
other, but to present the pure right and left limit to approaching unconventional 
warfare, attempting to widen the theoretical space in which the United States can 
maneuver.  Where “hearts and minds” attempts to gain support by addressing 
grievances and expecting the population to give support as reciprocation, the 
“authoritative control” approach builds upon the notion that humans will look to 
and support an authority figure, for a certain amount of time, in an altered 
environment.  Currently, American doctrine does not recognize the latter 
approach and continues to implement the first.  In simple parlance, when playing 
poker, one should not pursue a flush when dealt a full house.  The United States 
is currently attempting this as it pursues a “hearts and minds” approach when we 
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are in better position to play an “authoritative control” strategy.  In most 
instances, America should play its stronger hand and pursue a Machiavellian 
approach by implementing the “authoritative control” approach.         
First, history suggests that a major variable in gaining authority may be 
remaining detached, in several specific ways, from the population you are 
intending to target.  This is a polar opposite view to that of the “hearts and minds” 
approach that preaches that soldiers must become one with the population in 
order to be effective.  Throughout history, whenever a colonial power wished to 
gain control over a population and gain their active support, the colonial power 
presented itself as superior to the population, and took great care in not “playing 
their games.” Great Britain, for example, took great pains to avoid engaging in 
any activities in which the local population could possibly diminish their authority 
by doing either better or a comparable job as the Brits.  Turning to the man most 
view as the poster-child of unconventional warfare, T.E. Lawrence acted in 
precisely this manner and even documented this line of thought in his writings.  
Simply looking at his word choice reveals a great deal about Lawrence, and 
suggests he was more influential by remaining disassociated with the Arabs than 
he was by blending in with them.  In his writing Twenty-seven Articles, Lawrence 
talks of “handling” the Arabs, not meshing with them.54  He suggests that close 
relations with anyone but the top leaders will undermine efforts and recommends 
maintaining an aura of superiority over everyone but the top Sharifs.  The myth 
that Lawrence was able to blend in with the Arabs and, in his efforts become one, 
is a Hollywood fabrication and distortion of the truth.  Although not desirable on 
the silver screen, the ability to remain detached,  present oneself as an authority 
figure, and remain true to one’s own nationality has had much more success than 
the often portrayed dramas of blending into other cultures.   
Secondly, it is important to consolidate control and authority in as small a 
group of people as possible and, ideally, in only one central figure.  Historical 
examples and theory support the establishment of one leader as both the military 
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and political head of the unconventional campaign until order has been 
established and a functioning democracy is in place.  Machiavelli supports this 
idea when he argues:  
A prudent Organizer of a Republic, therefore, who has in mind to 
want to promote, not himself, but the common good, and not his 
own succession but his [common] country, ought to endeavor to 
have the authority alone: and a wise planner will never reprimand 
anyone for any extraordinary activity that he should employ either in 
the establishment of a Kingdom or in constituting a Republic.55 
 Little has changed since the 15th century in this respect.  It was the utmost 
desires of several groups in Malaya to have one ‘Supremo’ or ‘strong man’ 
appointed to consolidate power and establish control over the country.  In one 
instance, a nervous resident of Malaya wrote to the Secretary of Colonies: 
To us who are getting very disheartened, the appointment of one 
strong man who would give orders and see them carried out would 
be like a breath of fresh air as we battle vaporous mists.56 
 It was added that the man charged with this duty should have an air of 
authority about him, and should be “someone like Alexander [the Great].”57  The 
British adopted this line of thought and combined the offices of High 
Commissioner and Director of Operations under General Templar, a move that 
gave Templar “the most comprehensive powers ever given a British colonial 
official.”58  This consolidation of power produced immediate and extraordinary 
success in combating the unconventional threat in Malaya.  Since one man was 
charged with almost unchallenged power, he was able to blend a grand strategy 
into tactical executions.  Since power rests with one leader, this strategic apex is 
capable of altering strategies depending on feedback of commanders and the 
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constantly changing environment.  Again, we can turn to the Malayan campaign 
to see the benefits to adopting this approach:  
As the Malayan Government’s hearts and minds approach slowly 
took shape, it became clear that the strategy entailed the use of 
both the stick and the carrot.  Initially, at least, the stick appeared to 
be given more public prominence; however, the balance shifted as 
the strategy evolved59 
 Only in an organization that limits bureaucracy by consolidating power in 
its top leader can rapid shifts like this be made.60  This approach would make it 
much easier for political rhetoric to match up with military and law enforcement 
missions as both politics and operations are consolidated in one office.  Of 
course, a downside of this organization could be that the leadership is given an 
incorrect picture of the environment in which to base his decisions on.  The 
pinnacle of leadership should, therefore, ensure he remains well connected to 
the external political environment.  If we look to Iraq as an example of 
decentralized political and operational control, we can see that the political 
rhetoric stating that Americans will not be ‘occupiers’ of Iraq did fundamental 
damage to the necessary tasks the military must accomplish to create a 
democracy.  Military commanders should have immediately corrected this view, 
as it was absolutely paramount to establish authority in Iraq, a mission that 
required ‘occupation’ of several areas.  Unfortunately, as we witness today, our 
inhibitions towards being occupiers could serve as a fatal flaw in our strategy. 
 Another important aspect towards consolidating power in one entity is the 
already mentioned aspect that an organization of this nature is capable of 
altering course fairly quickly depending on the environment.  Again, turning to the 
current situation in Iraq, we see that the hearts and minds approach is producing 
desired effects in certain areas.  Unfortunately, in the areas where it is failing, the 
US does not possess the flexibility or fundamental understanding to implement a 
more authoritative strategy.  Since the US pursues a policy of addressing 
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grievances in order to gain popular support (the hearts and minds approach), 
how can it expect to win in situations where US presence is the main 
grievance?61  I argue that there are only two options: (1) address the grievance 
and pull forces out of the region or (2) develop and implement a new strategy.  
The US is sitting far too close to the attritional side of the Luttwak continuum, 
when it is absolutely critical to be butting up against the relational maneuver side.  
Once capable of developing a relational maneuver approach, it becomes much 
easier to deal with pockets of resistance and approach different scenarios with 
different operational methods. 
 
D. THE ‘CULTURE’ COP-OUT 
 Should the United States ever implement the “authoritative control” 
approach, then it must reconsider the methods in which it attempts to understand 
various cultures throughout the world and the rationale behind the attempt to 
become ‘culturally-intelligent.’  History suggests that ‘cultural knowledge’ is most 
important in determining how to influence power structures among a population, 
not in the attempt to work within it.  With that knowledge, power structures can 
either be manipulated or destroyed in order to meet the strategic goals of the 
occupying force.  My investigation of the historical evidence, indicates that the 
notion of ‘culture-centric’ warfare should either come under serious scrutiny or be 
scrapped all together. 
 A major proponent of developing ‘culture-centric warfare,’ Major General 
(ret.) Robert Scales, has gone before the House Armed Services Committee to 
argue the military must begin to implement programs that require every soldier to 
undergo culture and language instruction.  In several of his writings, he expands 
on this idea and suggests “the Department of Defense should be required to 
build databases that contain the religious and cultural norms for world 
populations…so that soldiers can download the information quickly and use it 
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profitably in the field.”62  Gen. Scales also argues that “every young soldier 
should receive cultural and language instruction” in order to enhance his abilities 
to be a “diplomat in uniform.”63  Dr. Montgomery McFate, an avid supporter of 
Gen. Scale’s viewpoint, argues that “cultural knowledge and warfare are 
inextricably bound.”64  McFate contends that an increase in anthropological-like 
knowledge of various cultures is the key to future success in unconventional 
conflicts.65  To support her claims, she uses the campaigns of T.E. Lawrence, 
the British experience in Malaya, and, strangely enough, the American Indian 
Wars, as successful models.  Finally, McFate insinuates that the Department of 
Defense should hire a large number of anthropologists to act as advisors and 
culture-repositories for their respective area of study (a suggestion that, in my 
opinion, would better serve the State Department).  Although the study of culture 
is important in helping one avoid embarrassing situations, how the United States 
ever interpreted ‘culture-centric warfare’ as a primary variable in waging a 
successful unconventional conflict must be called into question. 
 Calling upon some of the examples McFate uses as support for her 
increased cultural knowledge programs, it becomes apparent that knowledge of 
culture may not be as important as McFate asserts.  Her statement 
“anthropological knowledge contributed to the expansion and consolidation of 
British power during the era of empire” is only true if one views the 
‘anthropological knowledge’ she talks of as an understanding of how to 
manipulate social and power structures.66   Again, the historical interpretation of 
British imperialism as something that required cultural finesse must be called into 
question when the often-brutal historical examples are fully examined.  The 
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opening portion of this chapter has (hopefully) refuted the notion that the British 
used any type of ‘cultural sensitivity’ in their unconventional campaigns.   
McFate’s mere mention of the American Indian War as a model of ‘cultural 
knowledge’ is another major indicator that our current interpretation of ‘culture 
centric warfare’ is based on incomplete data.  With any degree of research, a 
student of unconventional warfare discovers that, quite contrary to McFate’s 
statements, American settlers understood very little about American Indians and 
made much more progress in their campaigns by killing off their main source of 
sustenance (buffalos) than they ever did by ‘culturally sensitive’ initiatives.67 
McFate’s use of T.E. Lawrence as a man who could “immerse himself 
deeply in local culture” can be refuted by writings produced by Lawrence himself.  
While it is hard to argue that Lawrence was unsuccessful in dealing with the 
Arabs during World War I, to claim that he was immersed and embraced by the 
Arabic culture is highly questionable.  Reading Lawrence’s Twenty Seven 
Articles, it becomes apparent that although Lawrence was schooled in the Middle 
East, spoke several dialects of Arabic, and spent considerable time in the region, 
he was unable to fully penetrate Arab culture and made more ground by 
disassociating himself with subordinates, portraying himself as British, and 
remaining “present and not noticed.”68 Lawrence himself argues against the 
attempt to blend with the population, stating that the attempt to become fully 
immersed is a costly exercise in futility and that greater gains can be made by 
letting it “be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian” at a much 
lower cost.69  In fact, Lawrence’s writings reflect a greater understanding of how 
to control forces through indirect measures and manipulate power structures than 
they do of deep cultural understanding.  One should also remain cognizant of the 
fact that Lawrence had a gift at inflating both his own importance and the overall 
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importance of his campaign in every media outlet he could tap into.  A separate 
thesis could be written on whether Lawrence’s influence among the Arabs or his 
influence among high-level British officials was more of a factor in his legendary 
status.    
Lastly, the urgent need for all soldiers to speak native languages must 
also be reconsidered given that some of the most successful guerrilla campaigns 
were directed by soldiers who spoke little to none of the native language of the 
people they were advising.  During 1943 to July 1945, Colonel W.R. Peers 
commanded Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services.  During this 
time, he oversaw what could arguably be called “America’s most successful 
guerrilla force” by directing Chinese resistance to a Japanese occupation in 
northern Burma.70  The remarkable aspect of this overwhelming success is that 
neither Colonel Peers nor any of his top officers spoke any Chinese.  American 
guerrilla advisors in Yugoslavia and Korea also proved highly successful with no 
linguistic capability.71  While communication was difficult at times, it did not 
significantly hinder the ability to gain strategic success nor did linguistic barriers 
serve as a major obstacle to waging successful operations.  While linguistic 
capability is certainly helpful in certain situations, the United States should 
remain cognizant of these campaigns before it goes dumping millions of dollars 
into language training for masses of armed forces members (who may or may 
not even have the capacity to learn it).            
 In a recently published piece found in Rethinking the Principles of War, Dr. 
Anna Simons of the Naval Postgraduate School provides a compelling argument 
that attempting to gain cultural knowledge in pursuit of a “hearts and minds” 
approach may be “more of a problem than a solution.”72  In the discussion, Dr. 
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Simons contends that, by adopting a strategy closer to the “authoritative control” 
approach, “destroying non-Western social structures, and, thus, non-Westerness, 
wouldn’t be as difficult as many might assume.”73  She goes on to argue that 
“forcing people to have to change” is far easier than trying to “encourage people 
to want to change in the wake of surgical attacks.”74  As stated in previous 
chapters, most successful unconventional campaigns were won by establishing 
authority by force, not through the attempt to gain friends among the population. 
 Only after control had been established did attempts to pacify and win the 
hearts of the locals begin.  The French, another country we routinely view as 
culturally educated, won their conflicts in precisely this manner.  In William 
Hoisington’s book Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco, the following 
statement reveals how unimportant ‘culture-centric warfare’ really was. 
Pacification came everywhere through armed and bitter contests 
with resistant townsmen and tribesmen.  Pacification was war, not 
peace.  Politics and economics did little to pacify the people of 
Morocco’s cities or tribes of the Middle Atlas until they were 
subdued by the threat or use of force.75 
 It was only after the population submitted to the authority of the colonial 
power did culture even begin to become an important variable in pacification.  It 
should also be noted that when it was important to use culturally related variables 
during pacification, it was easier to use indirect control of previously recognized 
political leaders than it was to ‘fit in’ and control the population directly.   
In conclusion, to use ‘a lack of cultural understanding’ as an excuse for 
failing in a campaign is highly disputed by historical examples.  Most ancient 
empires knew little, nor cared to learn more, about the culture of the enemy they 
were attempting to subjugate.  They instead immediately established authority 
and changed the environment in which the population lived.  The British and 
French, in many instances, found it far easier to change the environment than to 
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work within the existing one.  Instead of pandering their operations to specific 
cultural distinctions, they developed campaigns targeting variables deemed 
important to every human (such as security, shelter, food, water, and medical 
care).  This is not to say that cultural awareness is not important (as it helps to 
prevent one from sparking major incidents), it is just not as important as the 
American military is currently attempting to make it.  Where ‘culture centric 
warfare’ has few examples (if any) of success, history is replete with examples of 
nations successfully using the “authoritative control” approach to gain the support 
of the population.  As Samuel P. Huntington stated in The Clash of Civilizations; 
The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values 
or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were 
converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized 
violence.  Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never 
do.76 
 Perhaps the United States would be wise to remember that concept and 
begin to expand its current unconventional warfare doctrine to include 
approaches that use the views of non-Westerners to its advantage.  As most 
view the American military as a superior force, the United States is holding a full 
house if it decides to play its cards right.  Unfortunately, America continues to 
chase the flush by implementing the “hearts and minds” approach to 
unconventional warfare.  
                
                                            
76 Samuel P Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, v72 n3. (Summer 
1993), 26. 
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IV. COMPARING HEARTS AND MINDS AND AUTHORITATIVE 
CONTROL 
As stated earlier, this paper does not wholeheartedly support either the 
“hearts and minds” or the “authoritative control” approach, it only argues that the 
United States must be able to acknowledge that there is more than one way to 
conduct unconventional warfare.  In fact, it would be nearly impossible to execute 
either the “hearts and minds” approach or the “authoritative control” approach in 
their purest forms due to environmental, media, and political restraints.  The 
degree to which one uses either approach must be based on environmental 
considerations, calling for the United States to adopt a relational-maneuver 
approach and develop leaders flexible enough to adjust to the constantly 
changing environmental externalities.  It is the environment, not established 
doctrine, that should dictate the particular unconventional strategy in a given 
conflict.  To best educate leaders on the differences of these strategies, I first 
present a ‘pocket chart’ to better understand the major points of the two 
approaches, followed by a more detailed comparison of the two.  One must also 
keep in mind that what is presented are the two approaches in their purest forms, 
and that there are an infinite number of possible variations and combinations that 
can be formulated from the two. 
The two will be compared on seven dimensions: strategy; types of 
interaction with the targeted population; cognitive foundations; effectiveness; 
mission types; possible shortfalls; and supporting moral theories.  While there are 
probably other relevant dimensions, these seven seem to be especially important 
in understanding the basic differences between the two approaches.  The 
following chart and explanation of variables hopefully serves as a solid 





A. LAYING THE FOUNDATION 
 
Table 1.   Pocket Chart Comparison of Hearts and Minds to Authoritative Control 
 
The first variable that must be compared is the overall strategy that drives 
the two approaches.  On the left side of the spectrum, we have the “hearts and 
minds” approach that aims to gain the support of the population by addressing 
the grievances of the people.  The rationale is that if we can show the population 
that a better future is capable with their support and gain that support by 
performing civil action and benevolent deeds, then they will naturally choose that 
course of action over whatever other option is presented.  This approach 
attempts to give the population a vision of a better future and change their 
preference from supporting the enemy to supporting the efforts of the United 
States.  The strategy of the second “authoritative control” is to gain the support of 
 Hearts and Minds Authoritative Control 
Strategy Achieves victory by addressing the 
grievances of the people 
Achieves victory by establishing a dominant 
authority 
Type of Interaction w/ 
People 
People are treated as equals of 
police/soldiers 
Soldiers/police maintain aura of superiority over 
population 
Cognitive Foundation Builds on notion that humans feel the 
need to reciprocate kindness or good 
deeds 
Builds on cognitive foundation that humans 
comply with authority figures in unfamiliar 
environments  (Milgram experiments) 
Effectiveness Effective only in environments that 
already welcome American 
presence:  fails in psychologically 
‘non-permissive’ environments 
Effective in environments in which population 
possesses a negative predisposition to Western 
influences; fails in ‘permissive’ environments if 
prolonged 
Mission Types Building roads, schools, wells, etc., 
humanitarian aid, economic aid 
Strict internal policing, resettlement programs, 
control of food distribution, curfew enforcement 
Possible Shortfalls If done in wrong environments, 
wastes efforts and resources by 
implementing a strategy that cannot 
work; prolongs conflict and whittles 
away at domestic support if results 
are not visibly evident 
If not strictly overseen, may lead to human rights 
violations that find their way into the media; 
cannot implement harsh authority for too long, as 
it could worsen situation   
Supporting Moral 
Theories 
Deontological viewpoint; treat people 
as an ends to themselves, never as a 
means to an end 
Utilitarian viewpoint; do what is necessary for the 
greater good of the people 
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the population by establishing an authority figure and controlling the environment 
in which the people live.  This approach does not need to consider the pure 
preferences of the people, as the environment is so drastically altered that they 
are not given any alternatives but to give their support.   
The next dimension to be compared is the types of interactions that U.S. 
forces must have with the population in order to succeed.  According to the 
“hearts and minds” approach, it is necessary for soldiers to treat the population 
as equals and attempt to fit into their culture as best as possible.  This notion is 
best captured by the mantra “with, by, and through the population” that is often 
espoused by Army Special Forces troops.  This approach rests on the notion that 
if the people view Americans as their equals, they are more likely to respond to 
and assist American forces.  The “authoritative control” approach calls for 
American forces to maintain an aura of superiority over the population to solidify 
their position as a local authority.  This means that soldiers should avoid, at all 
costs, engaging in activities in which they know that they will be bested.  While it 
is crucial that Americans treat the population humanely with this approach, it is of 
utmost importance that the population understand that American forces are the 
authority in the area and not necessarily their friends. 
The third, and possibly most important, dimension to be compared is the 
cognitive foundation on which of these two strategies are built.  To do so, I turn to 
the writings and ideas of Dr. Robert Cialdini and his book Influence: The 
Psychology of Persuasion.  In this book, Dr. Cialdini provides his audience with 
six different variables that play a part in the psychology of compliance.  The 
variable upon which the “hearts and minds” approach is build is that of 
reciprocation.  When defining reciprocation, Cialdini explains that humans 
attempt “to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us.”77  What makes 
this variable so appealing to use as the basis of an approach that can be 
implemented globally is that “it is so widespread that after intensive study, 
sociologists such as Alvin Gouldner can report that there is no human society 
                                            
77 Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.  (New York: Quill, 1993),17. 
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that does not subscribe to the rule.”78  Basically, humans feel obligated to repay 
or give support to another human that has provided them a favor, gift, or 
invitation.  It is upon the notion that humans attempt to avoid feeling obligated to 
another that the “hearts and minds” approach is build.  Where “hearts and minds” 
uses reciprocation as a foundation, the “authoritative control” strategy uses the 
notion of authority.  Cialdini states that “we are trained from birth that obedience 
to proper authority is right and disobedience is wrong.”79  Humans have a 
predisposition to believe that adherence to authority will increase the 
“development of sophisticated structures for resource production, trade, defense, 
expansion, and social control that would otherwise be impossible.”80  Humans 
also strive, at almost all costs, to avoid the alternative to authority, that of 
anarchy as it “is hardly known for its beneficial effects on cultural groups.”81  The 
power of using authority as a driving variable in human compliance is that it is not 
necessary for the human to actually want to give the support requested.  Stanley 
Milgram’s experiments with authority conclude that, in order not to defy the 
wishes of an authority figure, humans will perform tasks to which they are initially 
opposed.82  Both the fear of anarchy and punishment from a superior make the 
cognitive factor of authority a powerful one indeed.  While both authority and 
reciprocation can be applied universally, there are some environments in which 
one is superior to another.  Because of this, the compliance variables of 
reciprocation and authority will play a huge role in determining the effectiveness 
of each strategy in different environments. 
A strategy is not worth implementing if it is known that it will ultimately lead 
to defeat.  Keeping this in mind, one must realize both the “hearts and minds” 
and “authoritative control” will lead to defeat if implemented in the improper 
environment.  When implementing the “hearts and minds” strategy, it must be 
                                            
78 Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.  (New York: Quill, 1993, 18. 
79 Ibid. p.220. 
80 Ibid. p. 216 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid. p. 213. 
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realized that a humans desire to reciprocate goes only so far.  To illustrate this 
concept, consider the following example: 
You and your family walk into a local shopping mall where you are 
immediately met by a 6-year old, blond haired, blue eyed boy 
wearing a blue outfit with a yellow scarf.  He greets you with a 
toothy hello and gives you and every member of your family a 
pencil and a sticker and explains that the gifts are free of charge. 
He goes on to explain that he is here today to help raise money for 
hurricane relief efforts on behalf of the Boy Scouts of America.  If 
you are like most Americans, you will probably give the young boy 
some money, most likely equaling or exceeding the value of the 
gifts he gave you “free of charge.”  You are driven to do so because 
of the need to reciprocate a good deed and because you have a 
generally positive predisposition towards the organization he 
represents and a feeling the money will go to good use.  Now, 
rewind the scenario and play it again under different circumstances.  
Again, you and your family walk into the same mall and are greeted 
by the same 6-year old boy wearing a uniform.  He again greets 
you warmly and passes out pencils and stickers to each member of 
your family.  When asked to explain his gifts, he responds that he is 
there to raise money for hurricane relief efforts on behalf of the 
local Nazi-youth.  Now, like most Americans, a red flag immediately 
goes up in your head and you probably ask the boy to confirm the 
organization he represents, just to make sure you heard him 
correctly.  Although you feel the need to reciprocate his generosity, 
a different urge overwhelms you and you either return his gifts or 
walk away in disgust.  Why do the reactions differ from the first 
example to the second?  Largely because of the predispositions we 
hold towards the organization each little boy represented. 
 I argue that a good-intentioned America often goes into an environment 
wishing to play the reciprocation card to gain support, but is often viewed in the 
same light as we in the US view Nazi youth.  Although the US is there to give the 
population a gift and a promise of better days ahead, the US represents 
something very wicked to several societies around the world, and therefore, not 
to be trusted or supported.  In this type of environment, the “hearts and minds” 
approach is unlikely to produce the desired results.  Only in a psychologically 
permissive environment, one in which a generally good predisposition towards 
American involvement is held, can a dominant “hearts and minds” approach be 
viable.  Conversely, if the US pursues a pure “authoritative control” strategy in an 
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environment that actually wants to give us support, it could fail miserably and 
produce a revolutionary backlash.  As the environment shifts from 
psychologically permissive to non-permissive, so should the American UW 
strategy shift from the strategy of “hearts and minds” towards “authoritative 
control” to ensure an increased probability of success.  This environment can 
change from, country to country, town to town, or even street to street depending 
on the dynamics of the population.  It is for this reason America must understand 
the environment into which it enters and maximizes it chances of victory by 
adopting an approach that is both flexible, and easily adaptable. 
 Naturally, as a strategy differs, so too will the missions required to properly 
implement them.  In a purely “hearts and minds” strategy, typical missions will 
revolve around providing humanitarian aid and improving the living conditions of 
the population.  These include, but are not limited to, building roads, churches, 
sanitary systems, religious structures, schools, or providing medical, dental, or 
psychological care.  On the other side of the spectrum, the “authoritative control” 
strategy revolves around missions designed to maintain control and give an 
appearance of an altered environment.  These missions include strict internal 
policing, resettlement programs, food distribution measures, population 
movement controls, and curfew enforcement.  American forces should be trained 
and educated enough to implement each mission properly, according to the 
dynamics of the particular environment. 
 While both strategies have tremendous strengths, they also possess some 
serious shortfalls that must be understood and avoided.  For the “hearts and 
minds” strategy, it is far too easy to become too liberal and waste resources and 
manpower in an effort that is doomed to failure.  If this strategy is adopted, 
constant feedback must be provided to both the domestic American audience 
and military decision makers to prevent the deterioration of political and domestic 
support.  If “hearts and minds” is applied in the improper environment, it will 
prolong the conflict and may cause more casualties than the implementation of a 
harsher strategy would.  The “authoritative control” approach revolves around 
maintaining an aura of superiority and, due to this, is prone to producing human 
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rights violations.  If not properly and strictly overseen, power often goes to the 
heads of young troops and could produce incidents of torture and abuse.  If these 
incidents are captured by media outlets, which they are sure to do, they can have 
disastrous effects upon the credibility of the US and forever doom the outcome of 
the conflict. 
 Finally, the variable of morality must also be addressed.  It is far too easy 
for the casual critic to look at the “authoritative control” strategy and dismiss it as 
immoral.  In fact, there is a strong moral theory that supports the “authoritative 
control” strategy as long as it produces harmony as an endstate.  The “hearts 
and minds” approach is widely accepted by Americans as moral, as we in the US 
tend to place a primacy on individuality and personal freedoms.  The “hearts and 
minds” approach is supported by a popular moral theory promoted by eighteenth 
century philosopher Immanuel Kant.  Dubbed deontological ethics, Kant 
preached that humans should always be treated as an end to themselves, and 
never as a means to an ends.  This means that humans should always strive to 
do what is right for a particular individual in a particular situation and stresses the 
primacy of individual human rights.83  Deontology preaches that an action should 
be judged as moral or immoral regardless of the outcome it may produce in the 
future.  This line of thought is the polar opposite of the theory supporting the 
“authoritative control” strategy.  The “authoritative control” strategy is supported 
by the ideas of John Stuart Mills and the moral theory of utilitarianism.  According 
to utilitarianism, the notion of moral correctness is based on the outcomes of 
choosing one policy over another.84  According to this theory, morality is only 
judged by the consequences of an action, not by the actual action taken.  
Basically, if one must do something immoral to produce a moral endstate, then 
utilitarianism states that the immoral action is rectified by the moral outcome.  
                                            
83 The section on the deontological viewpoint was influenced by the following: George Lober, 
Classroom instruction:  Critical Thinking and Ethical Decisionmaking.  (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005).  Johnson, R.N.  Deontological Ethics. 
http://showme.missouri.edu/~philrnj/deon.html. Accessed 20 October 2005. 
84 The section covering utilitarianism was influenced by the following:  Online Guide to Ethics 
and Moral Philosophy.  Utilitarian Theories.  
http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/sect9.html. Accessed 18 October 2005. 
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Popular in countries that hold the overall welfare of the society over the 
promotion of individual freedoms, utilitarianism is both well established and 
widely used as a moral foundation.  Again, the intent of this paper is neither to 
side with either theory, nor promote one over the other, but simply to suggest that 
both strategies have strong moral theories that both support and refute their 
implementation. 
 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE UNCONVENTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
As with everything in life, it is necessary to understand the environment 
one is operating in before blindly pursuing a strategy for obtaining a given goal.  
It would be foolish for a football coach to continue running the football if the 
opposition’s defensive unit continually stuffed their running back near the line of 
scrimmage, stopping any chance of a running game.   Only an unsuccessful 
boxer would continue to throw jabs against an opponent with longer reach and 
quicker hands.  Success, therefore, lies in the ability to quickly read the opponent 
and operating environment and to implement the strategy that gives the highest 
probability of success. 
Unfortunately for the United States, the ability to read the unconventional 
operating environment is, at the present time, an underdeveloped skill.  This 
stems from the predominantly conventional education of both military strategists 
and political leadership.  A popular saying among military members is that one 
must “train for the known, and educate for the unknown.”  It is the educated 
commander who can foresee possible situations and draw upon historical 
examples to give his forces the best chance for victory.  American military 
leaders such as Washington, Grant, Lee, Patton, Eisenhower, Schwarzkopf and 
Powell serve as great examples of well-educated conventional military officers 
capable of exploiting an opposition’s weaknesses on any given battlefield.  When 
one tries to conjure names of successful unconventional commanders, the task 
becomes much more difficult and the list of names becomes much smaller.  I 
argue that this is, in large part, due to the limited education and experience in the 
art of unconventional warfare.  Without an education on the matter, 
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unconventional commanders remained constrained by doctrine and blind to 
opportunities each environment presents. 
As conventional battles require varying degrees of maneuver warfare and 
straight attrition to defeat a fielded force, unconventional conflicts require a blend 
of outright authority with acts of goodwill in order to gain popular support.  It is 
only the commander who is appropriately educated that can acutely implement 
the proper actions to the given environment.  This commander cannot remain 
tied to only one approach, as the unconventional domain demands constant 
innovation and adaptation to be successful.  A commander must also have a 
force of personality that can range from a dictator to a beacon of peace as the 
environment deems necessary.  Leaders must be able to simultaneously 
command respect while remaining on friendly terms to the population and 
coalition partners. 
It may also be important to consider the capacity for a commander to 
implement the necessary strategy in the proper sequence.  Although little work 
has been done on the matter, the proper timing of each method may be a 
dominant variable in determining success.  I would argue, like the kindergarten 
teacher that is too lenient on her first day of instruction, that it becomes 
impossible to become ‘harder’ in ones approach if one initially presents oneself 
as soft.  As the saying goes, “start off hard and work back from there.”  Again, it 
would be interesting to see the outcome had American troops been used as a 
police and occupying force immediately to establish order in Iraq after the fall of 
Baghdad, instead of presenting ourselves as ‘liberators’ and allowing the country 
to fall into anarchy.  Perhaps a great deal of the current problems would have 
been avoided by this simple line of thought.     
In conclusion, it is important for students of unconventional warfare to 
realize that a broad spectrum exists in which to maneuver towards success.  This 
chapter argues that American unconventional policy has been constrained by an 
improper interpretation of history and that it is possible to be more successful by 
implementing a authoritative approach in certain environments.  To do so, a 
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grand strategy must be developed that promotes a relational-maneuver approach 
to irregular warfare that allows the American response to vary according to the 
environment it faces.  In an unconventional conflict, history shows it is more 
important to have a military force that is opportunistic than one that is capable of 
efficiently executing a rigid strategy.  Again, the relational maneuver approach 
demonstrates superiority over the attritional approach in this aspect.  It is also 
necessary to develop a force capable of reading different environments and 
quickly adapting their strategy to fit best within it.               
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
For the foreseeable future, it has become apparent that the United States 
will be engaged in conflicts far different that the ones it is used to.  The 
predominant change in these conflicts is where military efforts must be focused in 
order to achieve success.  In the recent past, the American military proved highly 
successful in conflicts where the opposition’s center of gravity rested with its 
military force.  In these battles, American forces proved almost invincible, easily 
targeting and destroying any fielded force put before it.  In campaigns where the 
opponent’s center of gravity rested closer to the population, the American military 
has floundered and was often forced to withdraw under waning political and 
public support.  Unfortunately for the United States, the trend of warfare is 
beginning to shift to exactly this style of war. 
Due to this change, it has become necessary for the American military to 
begin shifting resources away from defeating a fielded military force and begin to 
research and invest in methods used to capture the support of the population.  
Current American unconventional doctrine, a faulty interpretation of British 
“hearts and minds” campaigns, is both historically unsuccessful and too inflexible 
to continue universally implementing in the future.  The United States must be 
willing to expand the boundaries of its unconventional strategy to include 
methods used in an approach that history suggests is far more powerful than the 
current American approach.  This method, dubbed the “authoritative control” 
approach in this discussion, requires a serious change in both political and 
military thought to be implemented successfully.  It also requires a deep 
understanding of history and a willingness to accept the often ugly ground truths, 
devoid of personal beliefs of interpretation, associated with successful 
unconventional strategies. 
Should the United States decide to undertake this difficult task, a startling 
revelation could occur that forever alters future unconventional strategy.  History 
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reveals the need for an approach that is responsive to each unconventional 
environment and that the victors in these environments are the ones best suited 
to adapt to and exploit the moves of their opponents.  This approach calls for the 
ability to change from a very strict and controlling presence (often to the initial 
displeasure of the population) to one that begins to build rapport with the 
populace in order to gain long-term trust and support.  The proper execution of 
these different approaches requires leadership that are in tune with the 
environment, that understand and are educated for the complexities of irregular 
warfare, and that are patient enough to develop and wait for the desired 
outcomes. 
While these conclusions sound relatively obvious and painfully straight 
forward, the repercussions of pursuing this line of thought are extremely broad 
and could greatly affect the long-established hierarchy within the Department of 
Defense.  To properly adapt to the changing nature of warfare, it is necessary to 
break several old establishments, create a few new ones, and conduct honest 
strategic analysis on where resources should be placed in the future.  While the 
recommendations below are necessary starting points, the scope of this thesis 
limits the detail on which each recommendation can be analyzed.  It, therefore, 
becomes necessary for further research to be done on each of these 
recommendations to determine a more exacting fit within the American 
governmental and military structure.               
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Creation of an Organization Designed Specifically for 
Unconventional Warfare 
To properly execute an unconventional strategy, an organization must 
exist that has the ability to create the proper strategy, command the forces 
necessary to do so, and remain focused on their primary mission sets.  This 
organization must also have enough status to stand on equal footing with their 
conventional counterparts when the conflict deems necessary.  To realize this 
concept, it becomes necessary to move the career fields dedicated to 
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unconventional warfare out from under a conventional umbrella.  An organization 
must be created that significantly raises the importance of unconventional 
warfare, and puts the leaders of the organization in a position to advocate their 
needs and strategies at the highest levels.  While current doctrine gives this 
responsibility to United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), even a 
cursory review of organizational structure immediately reveals its operational 
impotence as related to developing and implementing unconventional strategy.  
To name just a few variables that limit SOCOM’s effectiveness in developing 
unconventional strategy:85 
• Although tasked with global responsibility, SOCOM does not dictate 
strategy in any given theater of command.  In fact, SOCOM is 
subordinate to theater commanders and is tasked to ‘synchronize’ their 
efforts with the larger campaign plan.  The Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOCs) also belong to the (predominantly conventionally 
grown) theater commanders and have limited strategic input in the 
creation of theater plans. 
• The majority of senior SOCOM leadership was cultivated in units that 
stressed the importance of quick, offensive, direct action special 
operations missions.  The type of leadership mentality cultivated in this 
environment is often far different from the one needed to successfully 
implement unconventional strategy. 
• Based in Tampa, SOCOM’s presence in the Pentagon is severely 
limited, restricting the organization from participation in informal 
decision making channels (usually the most productive channels for 
                                            
85 The variables that follow have been developed through personal experiences, discussions 
with several SOF officers currently working in SOCOM leadership positions, former Special 
Forces generals, and classroom discussions and lectures focusing on the possible weaknesses 
of SOCOM.  For obvious reasons, each member requested to speak on the condition of 
anonymity.  While each variable can be dismissed as my personal opinion several sources 
support my views.  Among those include:  RAND Study.  Translating Lessons Into Future DoD 
Policies.  (Memo to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dated 7 February 2005).  Bradley 
Graham, “Shortfalls of Special Operations Command are Cited,” Washington Post. (17 November 
2005).  
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making decisions).  Also, the SOCOM officials present in the Pentagon 
are simply representatives of SOCOM, not their top decision makers. 
• Even the Army Special forces are becoming the units of choice in 
conducting raids, direct action missions, and reconnaissance missions.  
While this is well within their capability, SOF units are being used for 
very conventional, surgical strikes while the long-difficult tasks of 
unconventional warfare are given lesser priority.  The fact that SOF 
units are usually highly rewarded and recognized for quantifiable 
mission sets like these only reinforces the notion that conventional 
missions are, far and away, the most desirable. 
• SOCOM has a growing tendency to rely upon technology and new 
equipment to solve problems.  Several billions of dollars have gone to 
SOCOM to assist in the acquisition and development of these new 
systems.  Unfortunately, history points towards the ability to innovate 
with bare bone resources and minimal technology as the key to 
unconventional success.  An increase in funding could actually prove 
to be detrimental to the basic innovation necessary to confront 
unconventional enemies with minimal resources themselves.  
 While this assessment of current military structure and SOCOM may seem 
harsh, the pinnacle of current military leadership offers supporting statements.  In 
an August 2003 interview, American Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
acknowledged the need for organizational changes when he stated: 
The militaries of the world are organized to fight armies, navies and 
air forces, and they get good at that. They organize, they train, they 
equip, they practice and have exercises; and all of a sudden we are 
in a world where the problem is not so much with armies, navies or 
air forces but with terrorist networks, terrorist organizations, 
asymmetric threats, cyber attacks, problems with attacks on space 
capabilities. What that does is it suddenly changes circumstances 






that they have to adjust how they organize, how they train, how 
they equip, how they maneuver, how they operate, and it calls for a 
more agile military.86 
 In a memo addressed to General Dick Meyers, Paul Wolfowitz, General 
Pete Pace and Doug Feith, Rumsfeld again discusses the need for 
reorganization within the Department of Defense when he writes: 
DoD has been organized, trained and equipped to fight big armies, 
navies and air forces. It is not possible to change DoD fast enough 
to successfully fight the global war on terror; an alternative might be 
to try to fashion a new institution, either within DoD or elsewhere — 
one that seamlessly focuses the capabilities of several departments 
and agencies on this key problem.87 
 Due to the constraints of time and focus, this thesis cannot fully provide 
the details necessary to create a new organization, only to suggest that a highly 
dedicated cadre of counterinsurgency leaders be cultivated and empowered to 
lead future unconventional engagements.  This organization must be 
independent of a conventional chain of command to prevent the strategic intent 
from being altered before being presented as an option.  Ideally, the strategy 
promoted by the unconventional strategists should compete with the 
conventional strategy and should be decided upon by an informed, educated 
leadership corps.  Once the strategic decision has been made, one organization 
would be deemed the supported organization, while the other supports the 
strategic plan in any way possible.  Admittedly, much additional research must be 
done on organizational design, environmental considerations, and interagency 
operability before this organization can be brought to life.  
2. Properly Educate Unconventional Strategists 
Where it is relatively easy to create and reorganize institutions, the 
changes made will have little impact if the leadership of these organizations are 
not educated in the style of war they intend to engage in.  This education of 
                                            
86 News Transcript. (August 19, 2003).  Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with El Tiempo, 
Bogota, Columbia.  Retrieved 5 October, 2005 from:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030819-secdef0603.html 
87 Rumsfeld’s War on Terror Memo. (16 October 2003).  Retrieved 3 October, 2005 from: 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm 
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military officers currently proves to be a shortfall as the vast majority of military 
education was written and developed for conventional warfare.  Even when 
unconventional warfare is taught, little detail is actually given towards the 
differing variables that surround each conflict.  Military officers usually walk away 
with simple lessons learned instead of a deep understanding of how variables 
interact with one another to determine an overall victor.  For those officers tagged 
as future unconventional commanders, a separate education system should be 
developed that fully delves into the complexities of unconventional warfare.  One 
such system of instruction, the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict 
curriculum, Irregular Warfare track at the Naval Postgraduate School currently 
exists to do exactly what is being recommended.  Unfortunately, only 
approximately 130 students graduate from this program a year, with many of the 
graduates being international students, information operation officers, and Air 
Force intelligence officers who may have a minimal impact upon US 
unconventional strategy as their career progresses.  It would be safe to say that 
only 50-70 graduates a year are of an American Special Forces or special 
operations background and could have an impact at the strategic level where UW 
doctrine can be developed.  To expand the importance of unconventional warfare 
within DoD, a larger body of unconventional experts must be educated and 
elevated to positions that promote the advocating of unconventional approaches.      
3. Conduct Analysis of Proper Resource Allocation Based on 
Threat Assessments 
Every four years, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Board meets to 
determine the focus of future military training and operations.  At this meeting, 
military commanders advocate their needs and recommendations are made on 
how to properly fund each service on how it can best fill the needs of these 
focuses.  Although irregular warfare and combating terrorism was a main focus of 
the most recent QDR, the funding for large-conventionally focused weapons 
systems drove many of the debates.  The Air Force remains focused on F-22s 
and Joint Strike Fighters, the Army advocates more mobile and lethal Stryker 
brigades and armored vehicles, and the Navy and Marine Corps focus on large 
sea-basing complexes in which to forward deploy troops.  If one believes the 
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future threat to American security is to be found in unconventional warfare and 
irregular threats, then serious scrutiny should be given to the proposals of the 
services.  To win unconventionally, history points to the need for greater human 
intelligence gathering capability, greater troop strength, population control 
capability, and quick logistical response.  In fact, a review of unconventional 
conflicts suggests that technologically oriented conventional weapons platforms 
prove almost useless in the unconventional realm.  To rectify the problem, a 
serious analysis must be performed to determine the potential threats to 
American interests, how this has evolved in relation to American capability, and 
game theory analysis should then drive the resource allocation towards 
confronting each threat.  Although extremely simplistic in its approach, a possible 
example of how this can be done is included in the appendix of this thesis.  With 
more research and manpower dedicated to the subject, a much more precise 
recommendation could be made on which American decision makers could act 
upon.     
4. Stringent Selection of Commanders 
Finally, the concept of ‘time in service’ and other ‘box-checking’ notions 
should be given the utmost scrutiny when dealing with leadership positions in 
unconventional warfare.  In this environment it is necessary to promote 
commanders primarily on the basis of merit and capacity to develop 
unconventional strategy.  As stated earlier, it is necessary for commanders to 
have a unique personality that may be pinpointed through psychological 
evaluations, IQ testing, and problem solving tasks.  Those deemed unable to 
perform in this environment should be immediately replaced and reassigned out 
of unconventional organizations.  As many unconventional conflicts have been 
won or lost by the personality of a charismatic leader, it proves paramount to 
carefully screen officers for their capacity in the unconventional realm.  Again, 
research must be done on the psychological factors that make certain individuals 
successful unconventional warriors while other (often extremely capable) officers 
fail miserably.  Several units within the military currently screen applicants on 
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several of these factors, so, as the precedent already exists for testing, the major 
task becomes revealing the traits needed to achieve success. 
5. Properly Delegate Mission Sets 
 A major problem that must be addressed is the proper mission sets for 
different units.  As the war on terror continues, we are beginning to see Marines, 
Army infantry units, and Navy SEALs begin to take on unconventional warfare 
tasks for which they were not trained nor strategically prepared for.88  A clear 
delineation must be made on what each unit is capable and not capable of, and a 
single appointed commander must utilize these units in a manner that best 
increases the probability of success. Additionally (and possibly most importantly), 
is the need to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the State Department 
and the Department of Defense in an unconventional realm.  The U.S. must 
destroy the adversarial existence of these two organizations and come to the 
realization that soft power and hard power are not mutually exclusive in an 
unconventional environment.  As Frederick Kagan writes, “Diplomacy is not the 
opposite of war, and war is not the failure of diplomacy.”89   The sooner that 
these organizations realize that each have tools that greatly benefit the other, the 
sooner the United States can begin to achieve synergy in fighting unconventional 
foes.  
While this list of recommendations is far from all-inclusive, I sincerely hope 
it serves as an intellectual springboard towards deeper discussion on the topic of 
unconventional warfare.  If my opinion in this thesis has any merit to it, it is time 
America begins making some major muscle movements, both politically and 
militarily, to put it in a position to attain future success in warfare.  A system must  
 
 
                                            
88 For example, Navy SEAL teams are being used more and more in creating low level 
networks, Marines are being used to train local armies and security forces, and Army Special 
Forces teams are routinely being used for direct action missions.  Additionally, a recent 
counterinsurgency doctrine draft from the Army War College promotes the Army Infantry as the 
primary proponent for counterinsurgency operations.  Due to this serious overlap of responsibility, 
a detailed look at skill sets must be accomplished to delineate proper mission sets.    
89 Frederick Kagan, “Power and Persuasion,” The Wilson Quarterly 29 no 3.  (Summer 2005) 
: 65.  
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be created that minimizes the mechanistic thinking that currently plaques the 
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APPENDIX: USING GAME THEORY TO ANALYZE RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION      
In order for any country to survive, top political decision makers must 
constantly make decisions on how best to overcome future obstacles and 
threats.  The same can be said for the respective generals of these country’s 
armed forces.  Whether deliberate or not, political and military decision makers 
often use several variations of game theory to decide upon the force structure of 
their armed services.  These military strategists base these resource allocations 
on the types of threats most likely to be encountered and the probable costs 
associated with defeating them.  Since the end of World War I, the United States 
has proven quite adept at this, elevating the United States to the sole 
superpower status in the world.  Up until OPERATION DESERT STORM, the 
American military seemed almost perfectly tailored to swiftly and decisively 
defeat almost any enemy threat that opposed it.  This can be attributed largely to 
the threat assessments and cost analyses of military and political leaders of the 
past.   
For the most of the past 50 years, the American military has been 
structured, trained, and equipped to deter and defeat the Soviet Union.  
Throughout the 1990s, however, the ability to make force structure decisions 
based on perceived future threats have proven a bit trickier for defense 
strategists because we foresaw no predominant, symmetric, and immediate 
threat to the US.  The optimal fit for countering threats during the time of the 
Soviet Union was gained through heavily funding large weapon systems, such as 
Air Force stealth fighter jets, Navy aircraft carriers, and Army tanks.  The strategy 
and steps taken to achieve it were derived from the belief that the greatest threat 
to the United States’ national security lay in the ideologies and military power of 
rival countries (Nazi Germany, Communist Soviet Union, and Baath’ist Iraq) and 




communications improvements, and the trend towards higher globalization, the 
United States has fallen behind on adapting its military to today’s threat and 
opportunity environment.   
Today, the US must adopt two overarching strategies based on 
conventional threats and unconventional threats.  The first strategy relies on the 
ability to defeat another country’s armed forces on the battlefield with the 
understanding that, once defeated, the leadership and population of the defeated 
country will acquiesce and the conflict will be resolved according to the demands 
of the victor. This conventional strategy relies on the ability to confront the 
threat’s military formations and places a great degree of emphasis on internal 
efficiency, large and powerful weapon systems, and a strict, traditional 
hierarchical and command structure.  Examples of this style of warfare abound, 
from the wars of ancient Greece, the conquests of the Roman Empire, the tragic 
World Wars, up to the almost instantaneous defeat of the Iraqi military in 1991.  A 
conventional strategy requires a country to invest a huge portion of its resources 
and economy towards the creation and maintenance of this structure (formations 
of tanks, ships, air wings, etc.).  As previously stated, the country capable of 
fielding a formidable conventional army must also possess the force projection 
capability necessary to influence the international environment in the pursuit of 
long-term prosperity. 
The second strategy is the unconventional strategy.  This approach 
acknowledges the inability to confront the enemy’s formations and focuses on 
targeting the population of a country in order to mobilize the support needed to 
defeat an asymmetric threat.  It must be made clear that the term “targeting a 
population” does not mean attacking a population (like Dresden or Hiroshima) 
but, on garnering the support of a population and turning that support into near-
perfect intelligence, resources for sustenance, and a supply of manpower.  
Unlike the conventional approach, unconventional strategy does not focus on 
attriting the threat because, often, the threat can not be easily found.  Instead, 
the focus is on creating a conflict that costs so much to the aggressor, in terms of 
will, ideology, casualties, and resource depletion that the opponent has no other 
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option but to acquiesce to the demands of its unconventional foe.  The most 
respected proponent of this theory, Mao Tse-Tung, adopted this approach in his 
protracted war against a militarily superior Japanese force.  Over the course of 
almost two decades, Mao won over the support of the Chinese population and 
was able to prosecute a costly hit-and-run campaign against a tiring Japanese 
force that ultimately lost the will and morale needed to achieve success.  Today 
we can see the embodiment of Mao’s concepts in the several current 
insurgencies.  While the United States did not consider these conflicts to be 
major threats against national security in the past, today’s environment gives 
asymmetric threats, like smaller countries and non-state actors, the ability to 
wage effective campaigns against large military formations (like the US) without 
having to face the lethality of the American military.  Two examples of this 
asymmetric, unconventional threat, are the Marine Barracks attack in Beirut and 
the near-sinking of the USS Cole in Yemen. 
The fundamental purpose of this discussion is to point to the need for 
American military and political decision makers to reassess the costs and 
benefits of these two types of conflicts.  After doing so, as we will show in this 
paper, it will become obvious that, through both the increased lethality of 
unconventional enemies and the conventional skills attained by the American 
army, the United States must adopt a strategy that creates a much more 
balanced military force structure.  Game theory, and its associated variants, 
provide a user a very helpful tool in determining this mixture and provide several 
insights into American enemies’ most probable courses of action.                 
 
DOES FUTURE WAR HAVE EQUILIBRIUM? 
To begin the discussion on the proper force structure of the American 
military and how mixed game theory can drive it, it is necessary to show that 
future threats force the US military into struggles in which there is no equilibrium 
or arbitration point.  To illustrate this, we must look at a simplified matrix in which 
both the United States and its future enemies have two options. The first option, 
focusing resources to train, equip, and sustain forces in a conventional war, is 
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costly, but if funded correctly, provides that country a substantial amount of 
international credibility that results in a deterrent capability against other 
countries with strong militaries.  In order to consider this an option, a country 
must have an economy and infrastructure strong enough to sustain the almost 
insatiable demands a powerful military force requires.  The large military 
formations that are projected often can persuade other actors to succumb to US 
wishes simply by being “seen.”  
The second option is less costly and very effective in countering a 
conventional threat: that of an unconventional strategy.  Unconventional strategy 
focuses on securing the popular support of a target population and then using 
that support to mobilize the population in a military struggle against its enemy. 
While this option works well at deterring invasion by militarily strong countries, it 
does not afford the unconventional user the ability to project international power 
in the pursuit of strategic objectives.  Countries and even non-state actors, 
whether constrained by poor economies, lack of technology, or weak 
infrastructures, are more frequently relying upon this strategy to counter the 
aggressive postures of the few countries possessing strong conventional forces.  
Looking solely at the strengths and abilities of the United States military, 
we can show that there are certain scenarios the United States would prefer to 
face in a conflict.  Below is a matrix outlining these preferences.  A “4” represents 
a conflict scenario the United States is most prepared for and capable of winning 
– military formations against military formations – and a “1” represents a scenario 







Next we must take the opposing viewpoint, that of a probable future 
enemy of the United States.  To do this, an honest assessment must be made of 
 Conventional Unconventional 
Conventional 4 2 




the most likely enemy the United States will have to face until another 
superpower arises creating another bipolar (or tripolar) world.  A large number of 
military analysts predict future threats to come from militarily weak countries 
whose strategy is to use terrorism to draw the United States into lengthy wars 
that severely strain American political and military resolve.  Because these 
countries do not have a robust economy, the only time a conventional option is 
feasible is if the United States commits to an unconventional strategy and 
commits troops under this pretext.  Keeping this in mind, the preference matrix (4 
being best and 1 being worst) for a future American adversary is as follows: 
 
 




By combining the two preference matrices we are able to properly assess 
the “game” and determine if an equilibrium point exists in which it is possible for 
both the United States and its enemies to achieve an outcome acceptable to 
both.   That combined matrix is represented below (American preference is first, 
followed by enemy preference): 





After graphing this data, a better understanding can be gained about the 
nature of this “game,” and techniques developed by Dr. John Nash can assist in 
developing a force structure and strategy for the American military. 
 Conventional Unconventional 
Conventional 1 4 
Unconventional 3 2 
 Conventional Unconventional 
Conventional (4,1) (2,4) 








As the graph and matrix shows, there is no equilibrium point to this 
contest, and each opponent is forced to adopt a mixed strategy that maximizes 
the probability of victory while minimizing the costs associated with the type of 
war encountered. 
 
ADOPTING A MIXED STRATEGY:  PROPOSALS FOR A FUTURE MILITARY 
FORCE STRUCTURE 
The cost of building and maintaining a military force can be calculated in 
many ways – monetary costs, social costs, costs to national prestige and 
objectives, costs to the environment, and costs to human lives are but just a few. 
The Cold War was waged by two Superpowers, each armed with 
thousands of nuclear weapons, hundreds of large military formations, and 
millions of combatants.  Though the monetary cost associated with the Cold War 
military was exorbitant, there were few choices of how to confront the large 
symmetric Soviet threat; it required equally large and superior symmetric 
formations.  In retrospect, suppose the US strategy during the Cold War was to  
counter the Soviet conventional threat in Europe with much smaller formations 
but much larger unconventional forces.  This strategy would have most likely 





Conversely, confronting a Soviet asymmetric threat, Angola for example, with US 
conventional or unconventional forces, though not necessarily successful, would 
not have proved overly detrimental to US objectives.   
Today, the military is recognizing that the Cold War model must change.  
The US Army, for example, is moving away from large corps and division-sized 
formations toward smaller, more independent, brigade “units of action.” In order 
to model this shift, values will be given to certain national criteria and variables 
normally associated with “costs” to a particular country during a time of war.  For 
this discussion, we will look at five different variables (with varying weights) and 
attempt to assign overall values to the four possible types of wars.  Admittedly, 
attempting to calculate the cost of a major conflict using only five variables is 
highly questionable, but, as the reader will hopefully see, the numbers reveal 
quite a bit and serve as a foundation on which more extensive research can be 
done. 
 
Determining the Cost of War90 
Perhaps one of the best ways to calculate the costs of wars would be to 
first determine the major costs a country incurs when it enters into a conflict.  The 
five variables we deemed most appropriate were: political costs, economic costs, 
military personnel required for the given conflict, force development costs (the 
cost associated with the research and development necessary to build the force), 
and a variable we labeled as “other” intended to catch miscellaneous costs such 
as activation of the reserves, costs incurred by local communities, and other 
miscellaneous social costs.  We next looked at those variables and used a sliding 
scale from one to five to assess the costs a country could be expected to pay in 
this category.  The scale is interpreted as follows: 
5-  Major Impact on Overall Cost 
4-  Substantial Impact  
3- Moderate Impact  
                                            
90 In the following section, Lt Colonel Steve Whitmarsh, USA and Lt Col Ron Walters, USA 
provided the idea on how to determine the cost of each type of war.  When I use the term “we” I 
am referring to Col Whitmarsh, Col Walters and myself. 
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2- Low Impact 
1- Little to No Impact 
After assigning a ranking to the impact of that cost, we multiplied it with a 
“relevance” factor in order to give more weight to what we saw as the more 
important variables.  These “relevance factors” are as follows: 
5- Political Costs 
4- Economic Costs 
3- Personnel Required 
2- Force Development Costs 
1- “Other” Social Costs 
We finally looked at historical data to determine how heavy a price a 
country paid to fight four different types of wars, a conventional vs. conventional 
war, a conventional vs. unconventional war, an unconventional vs. 
unconventional war, and finally, an unconventional vs. conventional war.  What 
follows is the data we developed to assess the historical costs associated with 
each type of conflict. 
 
Conventional Force vs. Conventional Force: 
This form of conflict can be viewed as two major conventional armies 
squaring off against one another on an open battlefield.  Best characterized by 
what the world witnessed  during World War I and World War II, these types of 




Variable Cost Factor Weight Total 
Political 5 5 25 
Economic 4 4 16 
Personnel Required 5 3 15 
Force Development 4 2 8 
Social 4 1 4 
  Total cost 68 
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Conventional Force vs. Unconventional Force: 
This type of conflict can best be summarized by the American involvement 
in Vietnam.  In this conflict, the United States measured success by determining 
casualty rates inflicted upon the North Vietnamese fighters.  Unfortunately, the 
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces adopted an unconventional strategy and 
were able to affect the will of American policy makers without ever actually 
defeating American military forces in any direct engagement. This strategy 
ultimately forced the Americans to pull its forces out without declaring victory.  As 
shown below, the cost of this type of war is still significant, but still less than a 
conventional vs. conventional conflict.   
 
Variable Cost Factor Weight Total 
Political 3 5 15 
Economic 4 4 16 
Personnel Required 3 3 9 
Force Development 4 2 8 
Social 4 1 4 
  Total cost 52 
 
Unconventional vs. Conventional: 
This conflict was by far the hardest to calculate because there are simply 
no historical examples of it ever happening.  For a country to actually engage in 
this type of war would end in utter disaster for the unconventional invading force.  
We ask the reader to use his imagination a bit in this calculation and envision an 
“alternate” World War, where instead of the United States sending over an 
armada of tanks, infantry, aircraft, and naval assets looking to engage the 
German military, we instead sent over several lightly armed Special Forces 
groups that were tasked to live in and around the German population in an 
attempt to win their support.  Needless to say, it would only be a matter of time 
before the German army rooted out and destroyed the American forces pursuing 
an unconventional strategy. 
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Variable Cost Factor Weight Total 
Political 4 5 20 
Economic 3 4 12 
Personnel Required 5 3 15 
Force Development 2 2 4 
Social 3 1 3 
  Total Cost 54 
 
Unconventional vs. Unconventional: 
While little is ever written on these types of wars, they are actually the 
most frequently occurring type of conflict.  A good example of this type of war 
would be the American involvement in El Salvador during the 1980’s.  If asked 
today, most Americans would be ignorant of the fact that the United States was 
even involved in a conflict with El Salvador’s insurrection forces.  This type of war 
costs little, and, if conducted correctly, requires little more than a handful of 
“advisors” that train indigenous forces in security and guerrilla tactics. 
 
Variable Cost Factor Weight Total 
Political 3 5 15 
Economic 1 4 4 
Personnel Required 2 3 6 
Force Development 2 2 4 
Social 2 1 2 
  Total Cost 31 
 
Assessing the American Situation (1950-1989): 
It must be reiterated that the values we attained in the previous sections 
were calculated using a historical look at several different countries and many 
different wars.  Keeping this in mind, it stands to reason that the United States 
can “cut” the costs of specific types of conflicts by developing technology, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that can dramatically reduce the duration and 
intensity of the conflict.  For instance, as shown above, a conventional vs. 
conventional war is by far the most costly type of war (with a cost value of 68).  It 
must be kept in mind that in conducting these cost analysis’s, we operated under 
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the assumption that the US military would be operating as an expeditionary force, 
never having to fight on American soil, and therefore, never truly blending into 
the population is an unconventional approach were adopted.   
Following World War II, the United States focused its efforts on developing 
a military force that could swiftly and efficiently defeat another country’s military.  
To accomplish this, military strategists developed a long-term approach that 
would provide the resources necessary to develop technology and weapon 
systems that ultimately bolstered the United States as a superpower in the world.  
With a power only countered by the then Soviet Union, it can be argued that the 
United States, though its singular state-on-state military focus, was able to “cut” 
the average cost of conventional war by a great percentage.  Using this train of 
thought, we decided to assign an “American readiness value” to the already 
calculated costs of wars to determine the costs American could be expected to 
pay in different types of wars, and the force structure analysis that falls out of 
these calculations.  For these calculations, a readiness factor of less than one is 
a good thing, as the United States has the expertise in this type of conflict to 
actually decrease the average cost (i.e. a factor of .75 means the US can cut the 
cost of a war by 25%).  We felt that the American military of the 1950’s -1980’s 
was best prepared to wage a conventional fight against another conventional 
army, and that the small core of unconventional warriors was better trained and 
focused than the average unconventional forces of other countries.  We assigned 
a readiness factor of 2 to the unconventional vs. conventional conflict simple 
because to send an unconventional force to fight a conventional army is, by 
doctrine, an act of suicide.  What follows are the costs we deemed appropriate 
for the 1950-1989 American military force structure.  
 
Type of War Average Cost US Readiness Cost to US 
Conv. Vs. Conv. 68 .8 54 
Conv. Vs. Unconv. 52 1.1 57 
Unconv. Vs Conv. 54 2 108 
Unconv. Vs. Unconv 31 .9 28 
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Reassessing the American Situation (1989-present): 
One can easily argue that the threats encountered in the Cold War era 
vary differently from those encountered after the fall of the Soviet Union.  A 
significant upward trend in globalization, huge technological developments, and 
worldwide communications capability empowered several state and non-state 
actors that had previously enjoyed only second-tier status.  Conversely, the 
American military has “pulled away from the pack” in terms of conventional 
military technology, effectively lowering the costs of conventional wars even more 
(see DESERT STORM for an example of a low-cost war).    These two factors, 
an increase in an unconventional opponent’s effectiveness and the conventional 
skills almost perfected by today’s military, make it necessary to reevaluate the 
costs of war to the United States.  Below is a summary of that recalculation, 
showing the improvement of the American conventional forces, and the 
newfound advances of an unconventional threat (making it harder to defeat).  
Again, attempting to invade another country and adopt an unconventional 
strategy while the opponent has the means and desire to conduct a conventional 
fight would lead to unparalleled disaster for an American force.   
 
Type of War Average Cost US Readiness Cost to US 
Conv. Vs. Conv. 68 .6 41 
Conv. Vs. Unconv. 52 1.25 65 
Unconv. Vs Conv. 54 2 108 
Unconv. Vs. Unconv 31 1.1 34 
 
How Costs of War Should Drive Future Resource Allocation: 
As stated in the opening lines of this discussion, whether intentional or 
not, military and political decision makers actively utilize principles in game 
theory in order to make decisions on the allocation of resources to different 
strategies.  As this analysis will suggest, the allocation of resources from 1950-
1989 proved to be an almost exact fit, while present allocations do not seem to fit 
the current realities of war.  Our analysis, which utilizes already established 
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theories of game strategy, could serve as a foundation on which to base future 
resource allocation and force structuring. 
From an American perspective, it would be useful to graph the costs of 
war when the enemy adopts a purely unconventional strategy and a purely 
conventional strategy.  The resulting graph should show policymakers the correct 
percentage of resources that need to be devoted to both the unconventional and 
conventional strategies in order to maximize the chance of success against any 
enemy and minimize the costs of war to the American population.  The graph 
below is the representation of the proper American military resource allocation 






Although the graph is not 100% precise in scale, one can see that game 
theory dictates that the US military should devote over 90% of its resources to a 
conventional strategy.  By doing this, the US can minimize the cost of war to an 
average of 56 while maximizing its chance of success against almost any enemy. 
Proper % of Resource 
Allocation- High 90% 
Enemy Conventional Strategy 
Enemy Unconventional Strategy 








When we graph this same scenario using the numbers we calculated for 


















As one can see, the combination of the unconventional strategy becoming 
harder to defeat, combined with the absolute dominancy of the American 
conventional military have resulted in a need for the US to rethink the way it 
approaches warfare.  Whereas a very high percentage of conventional makeup 
(9:1 conventional to unconventional) fit during the cold war, a more balanced 
(4:1) approach needs to be adopted in the current threat environment.  While one 
can strongly argue about the methods we used to calculate “costs” of war, there 
is empirically little foundation for an argument against our ultimate conclusion.  
The fact that we, as an American military, continue to devote over 90% of our 
time and resources to perfecting the conventional fight do nothing but make it 






Proper % of Resource 
Allocation- mid 70% 
Cost to US 
(1989-pres) 
% Resources Allocated to Conventional Strategy 
Enemy Conventional Strategy 
Enemy Unconventional Strategy 
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What the Numbers Mean 
The most surprising revelation about this method of thought is that 
resource allocation and future strategy are driven from the differences in the 
costs of war.  If we call the difference of costs in war if the US adopts a purely 
unconventional allocation ∆U, and the difference in costs of wars in America 
adopts a purely conventional allocation ∆C, then we find that the conventional 
force allocation (%Conv)  percentage to be: 
%Conv =  ∆U / (∆C + ∆U) 
If we use this equation to find the proper conventional resource allocation 
for the 1950-1989 American military, we find: 
∆U = 108- 28 = 80 
∆C = 57- 54 = 3 
Therefore: 
%Conv =  ∆U / (∆U + ∆C) = 80 / (80 +3) 
%Conv = .9638 or 96% 
 
We see that the costs of war, and the skill sets possessed by the 
American military during the timeframe 1950-1989 called for a 96% resource 
allocation to a conventional strategy.  If we look at the numbers for the present 
situation, we discover a startling outcome. 
 
∆U = 108- 34 = 74 
∆C = 65- 41 = 24 
Therefore: 
%Conv =  ∆U / (∆U + ∆C) = 74 / (74 +24) 
%Conv = .7551 or 75% 
 
While the outcome seems highly counter-intuitive, the equation suggests 
that the percentage of resources you dedicate to a conventional strategy is 
driven largely by the difference in costs in adopting an unconventional approach. 
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If we were to make future policy strictly from these numbers, it would be 
wise to devote 25% of our time and resources to developing our unconventional 
strategy and tactics.  By doing this, we could would also improve our “lesser” 
skill, which actually allows us to play our “better” skill (conventional) more often.   
  
Concluding Thoughts 
We, in the military profession, are always taught that we are no longer 
operating under the auspices of the Cold War and a bi-polar world.  
Unfortunately, it seems as though our teachings do not match our actions.  
Although military leaders are keenly aware of the merging threats posed from 
asymmetric enemies, we continue to invest time and resources into weapon 
systems and tactics that are only useful on a conventional battlefield.  The proof 
in this lies in just a few numbers of our current resource allocation.  Special 
Operations Command, the owner of the vast majority of unconventional capability 
and expertise, receives an annual budget of just under 5 billion dollars.  The 
development of just one conventional weapon system, the F-22, has already cost 
the United States in excess of $30 billion dollars, a sum that would fund SOCOM 
for almost 7 years.  Looking at the even larger picture, the DoD receives an 
annual budget around $400 billion dollars.  The portion afforded to SOCOM totals 
less than 2% of the funding allocation, a resource allocation that fits closer to the 
Cold War analysis discussed and a far cry from the percentage deemed 
necessary by our analysis of the current threat situation.  Until proper resources 
are dedicated to understanding and learning how to deal with unconventional 
wars, the United States will continue to pay much more than is necessary to 
defeat future threats.   
81 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Basilici, Stephen P. and Jeremy Simmons, “Transformation: A Bold Case for 
Unconventional Warfare.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. 
 
Chaliand, Gerard.  Guerrilla Strategies: A Historical Anthology from the Long 
March to Afghanistan.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982. 
 
Cialdini, Robert B.  Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion.  New York: Quill, 
1993. 
 
Clausewitz, Carl Von.  On War.  Translated and edited by Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1976. 
 
Edgerton, Robert B. Mau Mau: An African Crucible.  New York: Macmillan, 1990. 
 
Giap, Vo Nguyen. Big Victory, Great Task. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968. 
 
Giordano, Frank.  Classroom Instruction:  Models of Conflict.  Monterey, CA:  
Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 2005. 
 
Gill, K.P.S. “Endgame in Punjab.” Faultlines: Writings on Conflict and Resolution. 
Volume 1 No 1. (May 1999). 
 
Graham, Bradley. “Shortfalls of Special Operations Command are Cited,” 
Washington Post. (17 November 2005). 
 
Guevara, Ernesto.  Guerrilla Warfare (includes "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method," 
1963 and "Message to the Tricontinental," 1967). Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1960 (1985). 
 
Hoisington, William.  Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco.  New York, 
NY: St. Martins Press, 1995. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, v72 n3. 
(Summer 1993): 26. 
 
Johnson, R.N.  Deontological Ethics. 
http://showme.missouri.edu/~philrnj/deon.html. Accessed 20 October 2005. 
 
Kok-Wah Loh, Francis. Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters, and New 
Villagers in the Kinta Valley.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
Krepinevich, Andrew. “Are We Winning In Iraq?” Testimony before United States 
House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services.  (17 March 2005). 
82 
 
Lawrence, T.E. “Twenty Seven Articles.” The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917.  
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1917/27arts.html.  Accessed 2 October 2005. 
Lindsay, F. and J.K. Gailbraith. Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito’s 
Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
 
Lober, George. Classroom instruction:  Critical Thinking and Ethical 
Decisionmaking.  Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 
 
Luttwak, Edward N. “Notes on Low Intensity Conflict” in Dimensions of Military 
Strategy, edited by George Edward Thibault. Washington: National Defense 
Univ. Press, 1987. 
 
Luttwak, Edward. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire:  From the First 
Century AD to the Third. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolo. “Discourses: Upon the First Ten (Books) of Titus Livy.”  
http://www.constitution.org/mac/disclivy1.htm#1:09. Accessed 1 October 2005. 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolo.  The Prince.  Translated and Edited by Daniel Donno.  New 
York: Bantam Dell, 1966. 
 
Malcolm, B.S. and R. Martz. White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea.  
Washington: Brassey’s, 1995 
 
Maloba, Wunyarabi O. Mau Mau and Kenya: An analysis of peasant revolt.  
Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1993. 
 
McCormick, Gordon.  Classroom Instruction:  Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare.  
Monterey, CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. 
 
McFate, Montgomery. “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture.”  
Joint Forces Quarterly.  Issue 38. (2005).  
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq_pages/i38.htm. Accessed 2 October 2005. 
 
Miller, Harry. Jungle War in Malaya: The campaign against communism, 1948-
1960.  London: Arthur Barker, Ltd, 1972. 
 
Miller, Harry. Menace in Malaya.  London: Praeger, 1954. 
 
Mintzberg, Henry. “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit.” Harvard Business 
Review. (January 1981). 
 
News Transcript. Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with El Tiempo, Bogota, 
Columbia. (August 19, 2003). 
83 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030819-secdef0603.html. 
Accessed 5 October 2005. 
 
Newsinger, John.  British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland. 
Palgrave: New York, 2002. 
 
Online Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy.  Utilitarian Theories.  
http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/sect9.html. 
 Accessed 18 October 2005. 
 
Peers, W.R.and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road.  Boston, MA: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1963. 
 
Porch, Douglas. The Conquest of Morocco.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1982. 
 
Porch, Douglas. The Conquest of the Sahara.  New York: Fromm International 
Publishing Corporation, 1986. 
 
Posen, Barry. The Sources of Military Doctrine.  Ithica, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1984. 
 
Pruett, J.P. “Good Cops, Bad Cops, Carrots and Sticks.” Special Warfare, 
Volume 18, No.2 (September 2005): 18. 
 
RAND Study.  Translating Lessons Into Future DoD Policies.  Memo to Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dated 7 February 2005. 
 
Rumsfeld’s War on Terror Memo. (16 October 2003).  
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm.  
Accessed 3 October 2005. 
 
Scales, Robert. “The Second Learning Revolution,” in Anthony D. McIvor’s (Ed.) 
Rethinking the Principles of War.  Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2005. 
 
Schultz, R.H. and R.M. Beitler. “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in 
Al’Qai’da’s Operations.”  Middle East Review of International Affairs.  Volume 8, 
No. 2. (June 2004). 
 
Simons, Anna.  Classroom Instruction:  The Military Advisor Course.  Monterey, 
CA:  Naval Postgraduate School, October 2005. 
 
Simons, Anna. “Seeing the Enemy (or Not).” In Anthony D. McIvor’s (Ed.) 
Rethinking the Principles of War.  U.S. Naval Institute: Annapolis, MD, 2005. 
 
84 
Stubbs, Richard. Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan 
Emergency 1948-1960.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
Sturgill, Claude C. Low-Intensity Conflict in American History. Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1993. 
 
Taber, Robert.  The war of the flea: a study of guerrilla warfare: theory and 
practice. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Lyle Stuart, 1965. 
 
Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency :Experiences from Malaya 
and Vietnam.  London: Palgrave,1966. 
 
Tse-Tung, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare.  Translated by Samuel B. Griffith II. 
Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000.  
 
Vandergriff, Donald. The Path to Victory.  Novato, CA: Presidio Press, Inc., 2002. 
 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. The Honorable Thomas W. O’Connell 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) 
Washington, DC  
 
4. 720th Special Tactics Group/ Director of Operations 
Hurlburt Field, Florida  
 
